...t: 



475 

81 
F55 



H'^^^fN L.- n 



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^ r' €j^mi- 



'°''' ClI^lIMIIIil 




THE PRICE OF 



CHATTANOOCA. 



A DESCRIPTION OF THE 



y 



STRATEGIC PLANS, MARCHES, AND BATTLES 



iampitign 0f |liatta:n000a. 



WITH ILLUSTRATIVE MAP. 



THE AUTHOR OF THE "ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF 
THE CUMBERLAND." 



PHILADELPHIA : 

18 G 4.. 




c hj^irmP''^'^^'^ 





The Most Remarkable Book of the War. 




ANNAInS 

OF TIIK 

tmi) of the Ctunhvlanl 



A LARGE OCTAVO OF 700 PAGES, 

Beautifully Illiislraled uitli 73 Elogant Portraits, Engrawd on Steel. 

And iiimiy fine WOOD CUTS of Army Scenes; also 

An Accurate Mnp and Diagrams of the Battle-Field of Stone Kiver, the Map 

being Lithographed in Four Colors. 

WRITTEN AND COMPILED BY AN OFFICER, 

And Piil)lished in behalf of t}ie Army of the Cumberland. The 
Profits of the work to be devoted to the erection of 

A MfliiDeiit oil tie Battle-FieM of Stone River. 



The Biographies ot Oiticcr.s are complete, und their Portraits are 
given from Photoj;rai)hs taken in the field, and are.accnrate and lifelike. 

The sketcheK of the several Aimy Departments will show to the un- 
initiated their practical operations. 

Tlie work accomplished by our Army— its prominent Battles, Skir- 
mishes, and Expeditions— is given in full. 

The Spy i»nd Smuggling (chapters are true in fact, and are not over- 
drawn, and illustrate some of the most remarkable and interesting 
phases of the Southern Kebrllion. 

The Anecdotes .and Incidents are authentic, and, with three or four 
exceptions, are now ttrst published. 

The Appendix contains the (Micial Reports of General Rosecrans 
and Cii.neral hinixti, of Ihe Hatlle of Stone River. 

To the Soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, to their friends 
at home, and to the friends of tho L'nion everywhere, this work is re- 
spectfully presented as 

THE MOST INSTRUCTIVE, 

THE MOST BEAUTIFUL, and 

THE CHEAPEST BOOK OF THE WAK. 



<®"The Army will l)e supplied by orders taken in the field, by 
authorized Agents. 

«S-The HOOK TRADE will be furnished by the Publishers, upon 
the usual favorable terms, and to whom all orders should be 
addresse<l. 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., Publishers, 

PHtUDELPHlA, PA. 




SEE TABLE OP CONTENTS ON INSIDE PAGES. 





F : ; iiVdl s .:'.■■ u 



( 



CHICKAMAUGA. 



THE PRICE OF 



CHATTANOOGA. 



A DESCRIPTION OF THE 



STKATEGIO PLANS, MAECHES, AND BATTLES 






rcir^ -J ^. 



WITH ILLUSTRATIVE MAP 



THE AUTHOR OF THE "ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF THE 
CUMBERLAND." 



PHILADELPHIA: 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
1864. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by 
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 

FOR THE AUTHOR, 

in the Gerk's Office of the District Court of tho United States for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvauia. 



PREFACE. 



This pamphlet is issued as an addition to tlie first editions 
of the "Annals of the Army of the Cumberland." That 
■work has been so well received that the author is encouraged 
to add this matter to it in the body of the book hereafter, 
and as addenda to those already sold : to such parties it is a 
gift. 

The strategic movements constituting the campaign of 
Chattanooga, so little understood and appreciated hitherto, 
are here fully portrayed and explained. The reader vrill 
readily perceive upon its perusal that that campaign was 
one of the most wonderful, trying, and important of the war. 

The story will well repay perusal : a lesson will be learned 
in military strategic science, never to be forgotten, and the 
due tribute will be paid to the fortitude and valor of the 
soldiery of the Army of the Cumberland. 

"WTien the reader has scanned the lesson well, he will 
admit that this campaign and its attendant battles have 
given us two hundred miles of front upon rebel territory, and 
all Tennessee, changing the whole face and character of the 
war. 

The gallant Army of the Cumberland under Eosecrans 
shook the tree of secessionism to its uttermost roots : its 
fruits of \-ictory are now being gathered. 



ADDITION TO FOURTH EDITION. 



A BRIEF KEVIEW OP THE LAST ADVANCE. 

The fourth edition of this volume being required by the public 
demand, the author makes some material additions, which, he 
believes, will render the work still more valuable to the Army 
of the Cumberland and to the friends of Major-General Eoat- 
crans. Since the issuing of our fourth edition, a vast army 
movement has been undertaken and concluded, and a terrific 
battle has been fought, resulting in the displacement of the 
enemy and the occupancy, by the Union forces, of another of the 
iti'ongholds of the rebellion. 

With this there has also been a change of commanders of 
)ur arm}'; and hence we deem it especially appropriate to add to 
this record a brief account of the moving of General Rosecrans's 
forces across the Tennessee Elver, the flank movement iipon 
Bragg, the battle of Chiekamauga, the successful occupancy of 
Chattanooga (the grand object for which the battle was fought), 
and the construction of the defences of that place, with a few 
remarks on the relieving of the commander of the Army of the 
Cumberland and on the general situation. This addition, it is 
hoped, will render the " Annals" still more acceptable, as a com- 
plete history of the operations of the Army of the Cumberland 
under Major-General William S. Eosecrans. 

Before proceeding with our narrative of the direct advance of 
the army upon Chattanooga, it will be well to take a retrospec- 
tive glance. The advance of the army from Murfreesborough 
was planned by General Eosecrans with one grand purpose in 
view, — THE POSSESSION or Chattanooga. The rebel army was 

451 



452 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

then intrenched at Tullahoma and Shelbyville, and there a 
momentary delay was anticipated ; but the nook in the bend of 
the Tennessee River, walled up by grand old mountains upon 
every hand, was the object aimed at. The accomplishment of 
this purpose, however, was a matter of extraordinary difficulty. 
The rebels held the line of railroad, and, if compelled to retreat, 
would unquestionably destroy it as much as possible to prevent 
pursuit. The wagon-roads leading in that direction were rude 
and rough in the extreme, over continuous hill, valley, and 
mountain, passing through the entire Cumberland range, and 
preparations must be made at Murfreesborough to move the 
army through the wilderness, across mountains, and over rivers, 
by the ordinary modes of land-conveyance. The utmost that 
ciould be hoped from the railroad was that if repaired in time it 
would serve to bring on supplies in the rear of the army. The 
preparation for such a movement involved the collection of a 
vast number of horses, mules, wagons, compact army stores, the 
thorough equipment and clothing of the men, and the thousand 
• minor arrangements always to be made ere marching a great 
army upon an interior summer campaign. Here was one cause 
of the long stay of our army at Murfreesborough, — our friends 
at home becoming in the interim most restive at the delay. 

A second reason was, the great lack of cavalry. This defect 
was fully demonstrated at the battle of Stone Eiver, where the 
largely superior numbers of the rebel cavalry enabled them to 
come upon our rear and make the complete circuit of our army, 
destroying our supply -trains with impunity. General Eosecrans 
at once set about remedying this want; and the efforts he made 
to secure animals, by purchase, by inland expeditions of im- 
pressment, and even by the wholesale " pressing" of horses at 
Nashville and vicinity, are described elsewhere in this volume. 
Ky such tedious means the four regiments constituting Wilder's 
brigade of infantry were mounted. While this supply of horses 
were being procured, a goodly share of them, purchased for 
our army at Louisville, were necessarily taken at that city to 
mount General Burnside's forces in their expedition to the 



REVIEW OF THE LAST ADVANCE. 453 

Cumberland Gap, and also to go in pursuit of the rebel General 
John Morgan, who was then passing through Kentucky and 
Indiana on his last and most notable raid. The want of cavalry 
was finally remedied, to a limited extent, after much procrasti- 
nation and difficulty, that arm of the service being brought up 
to about six thousand effectively mounted men, — a force which 
was deemed sufficient to protect the immense trains of the army 
and to do scouting and pioneer service upon the march South. 

Another, and a very potent, reason, weighed in the minds of 
the general and corps commanders of our army. The siege of 
Vicksburg was progressing, and to advance was not deemed 
politic, — since if Bragg were driven from the valley of the Ten- 
nessee, the probability was that he would retire to Chattanooga, 
and, leaving a small force there behind intrenchments, would 
send the bulk of his army to operate with Johnston against the 
forces of General Grant. This view was taken by all the officers 
of the army, and was at length adopted by the people of the 
country. The result proved — many idle reports at that time 
to the contrary — that Bragg's army lay quiet at Shelbyville 
and Tullahoma, and thereabout, intact; only Breckinridge, and 
a small portion of the uneasy element of the rebel army, leav- 
ing it in that direction. The defensive works at both of these 
places were of the most formidable character. The rebels had 
been industrious, and, aided by the labor of some three thousand 
slaves sent up mainly from Georgia and Alabama, intrenchments 
were thrown up, earth forts, &c., quite surpassing the famed 
rebel works at Corinth, Miss., which for several weeks held af 
bay a Union army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. 
At Shelbyville these rebel works extended over a circuit of five 
miles. 

It must also be remembered that the co-operation of the forces 
of General Burnside was expected in the advance movement, he 
penetrating into East Tennessee, — which was eventually and 
successfully done. But further delay inevitably arose from this 
source, although commendable despatch was exhibited on the 
part of that auxiliary command. 



4M ARMY OF THE CrJlBERLAND. 

At length, when the above-mentioned preparations had been 
made, and when General Eosecrans was fully satisfied that the 
investment of Vicksburg was complete and must result suc- 
cessfully, he ordered the advance from Murfreesborough, as 
stated in a preceding page, on the 24th of June. Even then 
the means for a forward movement were not such as could have 
been desired, and many doubts troubled the minds of the old 
campaigners of the army, the most of whom had participated 
in the advance to the Tennessee Elver, under Buell, the year 
before. They well knew the rugged character of the country, 
and the long and unprotected rear line through a destitute and 
hostile region. It is a fact worthy of mention, that the corps 
and division generals of our army were b}^ no means enthu- 
siastic as to the position on their front. When requested by 
General Eosecrans to advise with him upon this matter of an 
immediate advance, the unanimous opinion, in writing, of those 
seventeen generals, was that an advance at that time was incx- 
jsedient. General Eosecrans, however, deemed it best to advance, 
,and the army was soon put in motion. Some time before this, 
the War Department had issued to the commander-in-chief 
strenuous appeals and orders to advance. General Eosecrans 
asked in return if such orders were peremptory, stating that if 
so, he would tender his resignation rather than encounter the 
fearful consequences. The orders were decided to be merely 
advisory ; and the general assured the War Department that 
preparation was going on in all possible haste, and that the fall 
of Vicksburg he hoped was nearly a certainty. 

The author advances the opinion, for which he is alone respon- 
sible, that short and ill-tempered orders from the War Depart- 
ment, over the telegraphic wires, upon this matter, developed 
a feeling of contentious opposition, if not of unjust action, on the 
part of the Socretary of War and his advisers at Washington, 
continually manifest since that time, and which has recently 
cropped out in a remarkable manner. That Eosecrans and 
Thomas, and the entire corps of generals of the army, were cor- 
rect in their views, has been conclusively proven by results. 



REVIKW OF THE LAST ADVANCE. 455 

The cavalry, that hitherto himc-leg of the army, was now able 
to cope with the rebel horsemen, especially since the loss to the 
latter of John Morgan's command. Teams and supplies were 
selected and compacted which carried our army over two 
hundred miles of difficult land-travel, and enabled it to wage a 
two days' battle, and to successfully enter and retain Chatta- 
nooga. Bragg's army was prevented from marching to the relief 
of Vicksburg, — although the country was assured by divers 
alarming reports that it had been divided, and even decimated, 
for that purpose, leaving a mere shell of Quaker camp-equipage 
and cannon to oppose to the Army of the Cumberland. That 
bubble was speedily pricked. Let it be borne in mind that the 
generals who thus confronted the mandates of the War Depart- 
ment are now in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and 
most deservedly enjoy the confidence of the army and of the 
nation. 

The advance of our army upon Tullahoma by flank movement, 
— the rushing into mountain-gaps, driving back, b}'^ gallant 
charges and sharp hand-to-hand encounters, the rebel forces 
stationed there, — the astonishment of Bragg at finding our 
forces marching past him and threatening his rear and rail- 
road, — his sudden flight, abandoning all his works, forts, and 
vaunted military resources of surrounding produce and forage, 
— his hasty retreat to the Tennessee River, followed bo closely 
by our forces that he must needs fight the while, and had no 
time to injure the railroad, further than to destroy nearly 
every bridge upon it, — the swooj) of our gallant troops across 
the Cumberland Mountains in pursuit, treading upon the enemy 
so closely that he failed in completely destroj'ing the great bridge 
over the Tennessee, several of the extensive spans midway 
being saved, — all this is history, and is in great part narrated 
in the preceding pages. Tlio series of marches from Murfrees- 
borough to the Tennessee lliver, and the attending brilliant 
successes, have no parallel in the history of this war. An 
army of at least forty thousand men were forced from their 
(orlititd Avorks by flank approaches, through mountain-passes 



456 ARMY OV TUK CUMBERLAND. 

which the rebels deemed they had sufficient!}- guarded, after 
most vigorous and galling charges ! But this great victory, 
achieved by strategy, rapidl}^ and gallantly executed, excited 
little comment, — and very naturally. Vicksburg had recently 
fallen, and the nation was aglow. The smaller success was 
enveloped by, or rather was incorporated into, the greatei-. 
Had the Army of the Cumberland stormed the ramparts of 
Tullahoma, spiked its seventy pieces of cannon, and driven back- 
its rebel defendera at the cost of ten thousand men, the victory 
would have been chronicled in story and in song. But to win 
victory at the least cost has ever been the study of General 
Eosecrans. 

Although successful in this movement upon the enemy at 
Tullahoma, a keen sense of disappointment was experienced in 
this regard. Our generals had planned the movement with a 
view not only to di'ive out Bragg, but to reach his rear, and, 
forcing him to a battle at a serious disadvantage, to overwhelm 
him and destroy his army. The weather had been most favor- 
able, and the country roads were in good order. It was miid- 
summer, when continued rains are unusual. But upon the 
morning of the advance the rain commenced, and continued as 
if the very windoAvs of heaven had been opened. For seventeen 
consecutive days the rain fell in remarkable quantity. No such 
stormy period had visited that country for twenty-six years 
past. The army moved on through the storm ; but the roads 
were soon cut up, and the rear squadrons and columns, with the 
supply and ammunition trains, were for several days completely 
" stalled" in the mud. This of course delayed our advance, an(J 
permitted Bragg to retreat upon his railroad with all his material. 



OEOSSING THE TENNESSEE EIVEE. 

There was some delay in the advance of the anny as it 
approached the foot of the Cumberhuid Mountains. This was 



CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STRATKUY. 457 

caused, by the period of incessant rain, the mud of the country 
roads impeding army locomotion, and the teams becoming 
exhausted and requiring rest. Meantime, vigorous railroad 
repairs were being effected; bridges were erected, the railroad- 
tunnel below Cowan was cleared out, and, by the time the army 
had reached the river, the shrill shriek of the locomotive again 
pierced the valleys, and the roar of hundreds of bread-and-forage- 
laden cars echoed back from the mountains of Northern Alabama. 
The crossing of the Tennessee Eiver by our army was a 
remarkable feat. After the completion of the means of ci'ossing, 
four days were consumed in the passage of the army at the 
various places. The constant measured tread of infantry ; the 
tramp of thousands of cavalry; the rattle and shout, and. the 
crack of the whip, as those four thousand heavily-laden wagons, 
in trains miles in length, bounced from the banks on to the 
narrow pontoon causeways; the heavier jar and crash, as the 
huge artillery vehicles rumbled over the planks, — all must be 
heard to be duly appreciated. The quick passage of our army 
over that wide, swift-running river, without the loss of a single 
man or animal, is a feature in army experience worthy of note. 
To effect this crossing of the larger part of the arm}^, Greneral 
Rosecrans ordered one pontoon bridge to be laid down at Caper- 
ton's Ferry, three miles from Stevenson, twelve hundred and 
fifty feet in length, and another pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, 
twelve miles up the river, of twenty-seven hundred feet. Not 
having pontoons enough to complete the latter, his engineers 
finished out the bridge by setting down trestles and planking 
them over. 



CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STEATEGY. 

We should state here that, previous to this time. General Crit- 
tenden's corps had crossed to the Sequatchie Valley, midway 
towards Chattanooga, to oj)erate against Bragg on his front, 
from the north and opposite side of the river, while the com- 



458 ARMY OK TUE CUMBERLAND. 

inands of Generals McCook and Thomas were crossing the river 
below. The Union commander had resolved upon capturing 
(.'hattanooga by strategic movements. In fact, he could not 
hope to enter it by a direct forward movement from the north. 
Bragg was there, in the nook ; his front a broad river, over 
two thousand feet wide, whose banks on his side were lined 
with cannon, ready to sweep off men from pontoon bridges as 
last as they stepped upon them, or to destroy boats, rafts, or 
bridges entire. Therefore a plan was adopted to this effect : 
Crittenden's corps Avas to go up on the north side of the river 
as far as Chattanooga, and there feign the intention of crossing 
and making the attack in front, — a la Fredericksburg, Va. Hie 
men made a toilsome march across and among the Cumberlands, 
dragging their cannon over precipices by hand, and accomplish- 
ing their task in about four days' time. Thus temporarily 
located i)i the Sequatchie Valley, he despatched four brigades — 
two of cavalry. Colonel Minty's and Wilder's mounted infantry, 
and Generals Hazen's and Waggoner's brigades of infantry — to 
proceed to points on the river opposite Chattanooga and imme- 
diately above and beloAv that town, and make the feigned attack. 
This was done. Some of Wilder's troops above the town let 
ends of logs and rails and bits of lumber float down past Bragg's 
front, as if they were preparing a bridge 5 other troops slapped 
boards together, to make a lumbering noise; while Wilder un- 
limbered his artillery and shelled the town. Some of his balls 
raised a dusty sensation over the way, one of them, it was said, 
having struck a church during the services of a Sabbath morning. 
While Bragg's attention was thus being occiipied, the two 
pontoon bridges below were thrown over and fords were worked, 
as already stated, and the main army of the Cumberland, under 
Generals Thomas and McCook, crossed the river. Our caValry. 
meanAvhile, went mostly by another and more western route, by 
way of Athens, passing through the town of Huntsville, — thus 
going around (flankiTig, in military parlance) the most abrupt 
of the Cumberland Mountains. The plan devised for gaining 
CluiltMiiooga we will now more fully elucidate. While Critten- 



CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STRATEGY. 459 

(Icn was thus to threaten with his four brigades on the opposite 
side, below and in front of that place, to mislead Bragg, the 
main body of the army was to march down into Georgia to 
two gaps piercing Lookout Mountain, and, passing thi-ough 
them, to come in on Bragg's rear. Lookout Mountain is a high 
range, or spur, running back from the river, just below Chatta- 
nooga, into the heart of Georgia, — a " hog-back" I'idge, so to 
speak, terminating at the river in a steep bluff. It is of great 
height, and its descent upon either side very abrupt and rugged. 
The railroad creeps along upon a shelf cut into the solid rock 
under this knob, near the water's edge, where the mountain 
appears to have been separated from its kindred links across the 
river by the floods of the Tennessee, which for countless ages 
have rolled down upon and past this barrier in resistless might. 
The river west of Chattanooga, in its general direction, runs 
southwest. Skirting it is the Eaccoon range, of which the Sand 
Mountain, where the army passed over, is part. After march- 
ing over a plateau twelve or fifteen miles in width, the Sand 
Mountain is descended, and the Lookout Yalley is gained, some 
two miles wide, running southwest, and bounded on the east 
by the Lookout Mountains, running parallel with the Eaccoon 
range. 

With this explanation (which we will soon demonstrate to 
the reader by tracing the campaign with him upon our map), we 
proceed with our account of the movement. Lookout Valley, 
coursing down along the west side of Lookout Mountain, ends 
against an angle, or another spur of that mountain, and this 
place is called Valley Head. Here there is a break in the direct 
line, where the rugged mountain melts away into a wild scatter- 
ing of considerable hills, near which the road is abruptly turned 
through winding valleys, — not forgetting, however, a jagged and 
stubborn spur which rears its head at this point. This, like 
some other mountain-ranges in North Georgia, is quite wide on 
its top, and, in many places, susceptible of cultivation : so that 
the traveller will occasionally meet with a small patch of a farm, 
with usually wretched improvements. Says one of the corre- 



460 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

spondents of the Cincinnati " Commercial," writing of the pass 
at Valley Head : — 

"After reaching the top, another plateau, some dozen miles 
wide, is encountered, so level and gently rolling, that one laughs 
at his preconceived ideas of the tops of mountains, — if, indeed, 
he does not forget that he has left a valley. No peaks from 
which to unfurl a flag, if any one should be geographically 
poetic; no sugar-loaves where one can clamber, and feel like a 
giddy explorer standing on a heavenward land's-end. There are 
groves and fields, and smooth-flowing streams, where the imagi- 
nation pictures verdant crags and cascades." 

Thus General 3IcCook's corps safely and speedily climbed the 
abrupt Eaccoon Mountain, which faces Bridgeport and Stevenson, 
and thence directed their course across, over Sand Mountain, 
through Valley Head, over Lookout Mountain, at Winston's 
Gap, until they reached the next valley, called Broomtown 
Valley, directly threatening the rebel rear. This was a memo- 
rable march, over a distance of forty-nine miles. From this 
newly acquired point General McCook sent a reconnoitring 
force to Alpine, three miles farther south, to threaten Bragg's 
rear. Still farther down, our own mounted forces were upon 
the move to mystify the rebel general, a detachment of Colonel 
Brownlow's Tennessee cavalry going within five miles of Eome. 

Leaving McCook thus located in Bragg's rear, we will explain 
the movement of the corps under General Thomas. He marched 
south from Bridgeport, over spurs of mountains and through 
deep wooded gulches, to the Lookout Valley, followed that nar- 
row and meandering channel to another depression, crossed 
through at Cooper's and Stevens's Gaps, after toilsome marches 
over the roughest of mountain roads, and took position at the 
mouths of those gaps, in Bragg's rear. This division thus 
marched fifty-one miles from Bridgeport, and was now twenty- 
six miles south of Chattanooga by the nearest practicable wagon- 
road. McCook's division was seventeen miles farther south, being 
a total of forty-three miles below Chattanooga, and his outpost 
at Alpine, over sixty miles. 



CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STRATEGY. 461 

The rebel commander now became fully aware of Eosecrans's 
intention, but too late, if he had even had the force, to prevent 
its execution. By taking possession of the gaps on his side of 
Lookout Mountain, he might have fortified them and prevented 
the passage of our troops. This had not been donej and the 
Federals were now in his rear many miles below, threatening 
his railroad and subsistence, and preventing the arrival of rein- 
forcements. On the 8th of September, General Thomas had full 
occupancy of those gaps, and on the 9th of that month. Gene- 
ral Bragg's army evacuated Chattanooga, going south, mainly 
by the Eome road. In passing down the valley, in front of 
Thomas, Bragg endeavored to cut off some advanced regiments; 
but Thomas cautiously drew them up to him, within the jaws 
of the gaps, and the rebel hosts marched southward rapidly, but 
in regular order. 

Meanwhile General Crittenden was moving. He proceeded 
to cross the main body of his troops over the Tennessee Eivcr 
at and above Bridgeport, following Thomas, and then took up 
his line of march for Chattanooga over the very brow of Look- 
out Mountain. Arriving upon the mountain, he found that 
Bragg had fled, leaving the town quite deserted. He entered 
the place at once, and was soon after joined by his four brigades 
from the opposite side of the river. This accomplished. Gene- 
ral Crittenden moved his corps out to Einggold, on the railroad, 
to reconnoitre the enemy. His advance speedily ascertained 
that Bragg had fallen back only to Lafayette, and had taken 
position. He at once moved with all possible haste across to 
Lookout Mountain, to be within reach of Thonias, for it was 
now apparent that the enemy were becoming more bold and 
belligerent. The reader will find no difficulty in understanding 
that the sole aim of all this strategy and hard marching was to 
force Bragg out of Chattanooga and to get in there ourselves. Not a 
plan was laid, hardly a thought was indulged in, which did not 
refer to that purpose. Chattanooga was the object of that 
campaign. 

We had taken that place, — or, rather, our smallest corps of 



462 ARMY OF TUE CUMBERLAND. 

troops had passed into and through it. But our army was mainly 
down among the mountain-ranges of Georgia, and its occupancy 
of Chattanooga was j-et to be. General Eosecrans and staff had 
also marched into Chattanooga, and he there fixed his general 
head-quarters. As for hiinself, however, and his other officers, 
with the exception of clerks and office-men, his head-quarters 
were in the field, miles below, solely intent upon consolidating 
and bringing his columns north. There were newspaper reporters 
also in Chattanooga upon the entry of Crittenden, and they 
represented to the world that the town was gained and securely 
held, and that the great Army of the Cumberland were now 
marching in pursuit of Bragg, and might possibly pursue him 
even to Dalton and to Atlanta. And there were shouts of a joy- 
ful people at the ZS'orth at this great success, as announced in the 
daily newspapers. But this news and- this joy were prematm-e. 
Kot so felt the several Union commanders. Eosecrans, and 
Thomas, and Palmer, and their co/ifreres, were then aware of 
what was soon fullj- developed, — the reinforcement of Bragg, and 
his turning upon our army. 

• The strategic movements of Eosecrans at once alarmed the 
Southern Confederacy. He was moving on them; but how, 
was the mystery. But they rallied their troops from every 
section. A large portion of Stonewall Jackson's division of 
Virginia veterans wei-e sent down from Lee's army, with Long- 
street, Lee's best general, in command. Brigades were hurried 
up from Charleston and Mobile. Buckner's army of ten thou- 
sand came down from East Tennessee, and a large force was 
received from Johnston's Mississippi army, which had failed in 
succoi'ing Pemberton at Vicksburg. It is ascertained, also, that 
a considerable number of rebel troops captured and j)aroled at 
Vicksburg had joined Brau"g's army, as well as some eiglit thou- 
sand of Georgia State militia hastily collected for the emergency. 
Thus Bragg's army was swelled, in one loeek's time, from about 
forty tliousand to upwards of eighty ^housand men. We shall 
prove this conclusively farther on. Bragg marched to a short 
distance below, and. at a point opposite the gajis where our forces 



CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STRATEGY. 463' 

lay, halted and took position. Here he met his first heavy i-ein- 
foreements ; and others began to pour in. He left Chattanooga 
on the 9th of September; on the 16th of the same month he 
addressed a notice to his army, to the effect that, having been 
heavily reinforced, they were now to assume the offensive and 
drive the invaders from the soil of Georsjia. 

Of this Eosecrans was early made aware, and to concentrate 
his army and get to Chattanooga, or, at least, to be able to select 
his position and prepare for the grand battle that was threaten- 
ing, was his great object. MeCook was ordered to come to 
Thomas, and Crittenden to remain within close supporting dis- 
tance of the latter general. We have stated that the gap where 
McCook's corps had crossed, and in which it now lay, was seven- 
teen miles below the force of Cleneral Thomas. McCook was 
instructed to use all possible haste, and, fully advised of Bragg's 
strength and preparations for attack, he moved with great 
celerity. He was informed of a road on the mountain-top that 
would lead him north in an almost direct course to the upper 
gaps; but, relying upon the assertion of scouts and refugees 
that no such practicable route existed, he retraced his march 
through the gap, across the mountain, to Yalley Head, thence 
up Lookout Yalley, to the gaps where Thomas had passed, and 
marched over the same route, joining Thomas at the mouth of 
the gaps, — whereupon Thomas moved away from the gap a short 
distance, towards Chattanooga and Crittenden. Thus McCook 
marched four days and a half over a distance of forty-six miles, 
when he could have come by the cross-road on the mountain, 
seventeen miles, in a day and a half. He acted, however, on 
what he supposed to be his best information, and the error was a 
very natural one. His corps made extraordinary marches during 
those memorable four and a half days, and he and his gallant 
men are entitled to the thanks of the nation. 

But in this delay there was fearful danger and loss of advan- 
tage. The rebel hosts were marshalling and advancing upon our 
army. Had they moved only a day or two sooner, and driven 
Thomas back within his gaps, holding him there with a portion 



464 ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

of their forces while they advanced upon Crittenden with 
their main army and forced him back to Chattanooga, and 
into the river, or among the mountains, how completely foiled 
would have been the Union army ! The campaign would have 
been lost, and we would have been left with our forces divided 
far down among the inhospitable mountains. These few days 
were days of deep anxiety to the general commanding and to 
his staff and advisers ! But Bragg, it was subsequently ascer- 
tained, was not ready to attack : his forces were not well in hand, 
and when he moved upon us it was too late to prevent the con- 
centration. The delay occasioned by the roundabout march of 
MeCook's corps was mainly unfortunate in this : it prevented 
the Union commander from choosing his battle-field. 

How imperfectly was all this strategy understood, except by 
the generals in command and their confidants ! The soldiers and 
the reporters were equally in the dark as to the object of the 
movements. The retreat of McCook through the mountains, to 
join Thomas, was described by a writer to a prominent paper 
in the Northwest, after the battle and so-called " failure," or 
" defeat," as a hasty and mistaken march farther south, to try 
to get in Bragg's rear and cut off his retreat; and the editor 
of this Northwestern paper was fain to believe, with due sorrow 
and mortification, that'Eosecrans had been completely outwitted, 
and thereby badly defeated. Other army correspondents sent 
to the world joyful accounts of the utter demoralization of 
Bragg's army, of his weakness and retreat, as they followed 
down with Crittenden's coi'ps in his march to the support of 
Thomas ! In their mistaken zeal, they already pictured Eose- 
crans at Dalton and Atlanta. They could not perceive the 
gathering of the rebel clans among those mountain-valleys not 
more than ten miles beyond. Had our commander-in-chief 
called into his tent these gentlemen of the press, and explained 
his plans and revealed the tidings brought him by his spies and 
scouts, they would not have fallen into such errors and have so 
grossly misled the public. But such revelations cannot be 
made. Better that the newsmen err than that Bragg bo 



CHICKAMAUGA. 465 

informed, through the Louisville, Cincinnati, and j^ew York 
papers, of the scheme that has been so carefully and skilfully 
elaborated, by which he is walked out of his fortified places 
and great natural defences without the firing of a gun. To hide 
his forces here and there among the valleys, — to move in such 
a way as to bafile the intelligence of the enemy, — to have the 
main army forty miles in the enemy's rear, when he fancies it 
on his front and just below him, — such was the strategy of Gene- 
ral Eosecrans; and to publish it before its accomplishment, would 
be far more disadvantageous than to permit the j)eople of the 
Union to be so grossly deceived by the eager and well-inten- 
tioned news-gatherers of the public press. 



CHICKAMAUGA. 



We have shown that Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on the 9th 
of September. He marched down past the valley of Chickamanga 
Creek, some thirty miles, to Lafayette. McCook's eovpa was at 
once set in motion to rejoin Thomas, which feat was accomplished 
on the 18th. Bragg began to march back on the 17th, to attack 
our corps in detail, before their junction was effected. In this 
he failed : JMcCook had come in from the south, and Crittenden 
from the north, in support. The reader will remember that 
Bragg attributes this failure to two of his subordinate generals, 
Polk and Hindman, and after the battle relieved them from their 
commands. Bragg now strikes for the main Eome road, leading 
into Chattanooga, hoping thus to get between our army and the 
river. General Eosecrans foresees this, and orders an advance 
in force to secure this road. General Thomas breaks camp at 
sunset, Friday, the 18th, and makes his memorable night march, 
over hill and through forest and valley, and by sunrise next 
morning reaches it and takes position. Within two hours there- 
after, the rebel advance reaches this road, a short distance below 

30 



466 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

our forces, and remains quiet. General Thomas sent out a 
strong reconnoitring force to feel the enemy, about ten o'clock 
on Saturday morning, the 19th. They found the rebels in force 
and advancing, and brisk skirmishing soon merged into severe 
fighting. The rebels were apparently surprised to find the road 
occupied in their advance, and gave battle with their accustomed 
impetuosity, following back our reconnoitring column to the 
Union lines, when the battle became general along the entire 
front. Thomas, by his night march, filing to the left past Crit- 
tenden, became the left wing, leaving the latter the centre, and 
McCook, retaining his first position, on the right. 

We shall not attempt to give the movements of the two 
days' battle in detail: the official report of the commander-in- 
chief describes theM fully and correctly. Our present aim is 
merely to give a general outline of the battle, in connection 
with the strategic plans of the campaign of Chattanooga. 

The battle of Saturday resulted in our general success. The 
contest raged along hillsides and amid forests and ravines. 
The army lines extended over nearly three miles of ground; and 
only by the smoke that rose above the heights, and the dust that 
ascended above the forest-trees in the valley, or as the cannon's 
roar and the rattling discharges of musketry were heard upon 
surrounding hills, could the observer note the ebb and flow of 
the tide of battle. 

When the rebels advanced upon Thomas in heavy line of 
battle, he informed General Eosecrans of the fact; and the latter, 
who was at the right, personally insj)ecting the lines, arranging 
batteries, &c., instructed Thomas to hold his position on the 
main road by all possible means, and that, if necessary, he 
should be amply reinforced. The battle raged all day, darkness 
alone ending the conflict. The fighting was constant, and occa- 
sionally furious. Brigade after brigade of the Union forces was 
moved into the conflict, until every brigade in the army had 
participated. At one period two of our divisions were badly 
driven by immensely superior rebel forces; but the lost ground 
was soon after fully recovered. No signal advantage had enured 



CHICKAMAUGA. 467 

to either side when the day's conflict closed, each having taken 
prisoners. But this day of battle had fully demonstrated the 
fact that the Army of the Cumberland was contending against 
fearfully superior numbers of determined and exasperated vete- 
rans. It was reported that some of the rebel Virginia soldiers 
cried out, as they charged upon the walled lines of Thomas, 
'You are not fighting with conscripts now!" to which the 
answer would be shouted back by the Western boys, " You are 
not fighting with Eastern store-clerks !" On the evening of this 
day there was a consultation of commanders at General Eose- 
crans's head-quarters, at the " Widow Glen" house, where it had 
been during the day, within musket-range of the line of battle. 
Each reported that every brigade had been in the day's fight, 
and that our troops had acted finely ; but all agreed that in every 
severe attack made upon us we had been invariably outnum- 
bered. It was plain that the next day's contest must be for the 
preservation of the army and the holding of Chattanooga. 

After due consultation with his corps commanders, the follow- 
ing plan for the second day's battle was decided upon, and was 
announced at one o'clock that morning. General Thomas, 
with Johnson's division from McCook's corps, and Palmer's divi- 
sion from Crittenden's corps, was to maintain his present posi- 
tion. McCook was to post the remainder of his corps on the 
right of Thomas ; while Crittenden w^as to place the remainder 
of his corps in reserve, near the point of junction of the other 
two corps, and to support either, as circumstances might require. 
These positions were assumed by daylight. It soon becoming ap- 
parent that the enemy would wage strongest battle on Thomas's 
left. Math a design to turn him and reach the main road, Neg- 
ley's division was ordered from McCook's line to take position at 
the left of Thomas, and McCook was instructed to close up the 
gap thus made in his line. 

The rebels commenced the battle early; and it raged with tre- 
mendous fierceness, at times, along the entire lines. General 
Thomas reported that the pressure upon him was most severe ; 
and he was instructed, in return, to hold his point without fail, 



468 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

with the assurance that, if necessary, he should be reinforced 
by the entire army. The rebels invariably attacked, and were 
as invariably repulsed, their object appearing to be to find some 
point where our lines might be penetrated. It was in consequence 
of this manner of fighting, the rebels moving while the Federals 
were in position, the latter often lying down and thus loading 
their muskets, only rising to fire and to repel a charge, that the 
rebel killed and wounded greatly exceeded our own. A multitude 
of important orders were given during this time, and many 
movements were made, their results conforming to this general 
outline. All went favorably, the enemy being held firmly in 
cheek and undergoing terrible slaughter, until about one o'clock 
in the afternoon, when, by the misconception of an order, one 
of our divisions was moved in the wrong direction, and a gap 
was left open in our battle-front at the point of junction be- 
tween Thomas and McCook. This the enemy quickly perceived. 
They advanced rapidly and heavily, and poured their columns 
in at the gap, taking both McCook and Thomas on the flank, 
crushing Crittenden, and completely changing the order of the 
battle at that point. General Davis's gallant old division charged 
in to stay the rushing tide, but in vain. General Eoseerans was 
speedily present, and ordered forward Sheridan with two light 
brigades; but they were also swept back before the rush of the 
now exultant foe. In fact, the right wing of the army was par- 
tially cut off, and Crittenden's reserve was forced back in con- 
fusion. Thus it was that seven brigades were isolated from 
Thomas and the main body of the army. Sheridan retreated in 
tolerable order, and by a quick movement eventually succeeded 
in getting to the support of Thomas. On both sides of this gap 
the fighting Avas irregular and against us, we there losing most 
of the prisoners and guns taken by the enemy. The rebels now 
charged down the valley, and among hills and forests, surround- 
ing, crushing, and capturing, until they were recalled by their 
leaders to assist in the necessary driving of Thomas from the 
main road. 

General Thomas was still in strong position with his corps. 



CHICKAMAUGA. 469 

reinforced by Palmer's, "Wood's, and Johnson's divisions, and 
one briirade of Van Cleve's division. The rebels now bent all 
their energies to the dislodging of our main army. They at- 
tacked, and were repulsed, again and again. Our troops fought 
well : they were nobly led. Thomas, Palmer, Johnson, and other 
Union generals, won imperishable honor by their coolness and 
bravery. From two o'clock until sunset the battle thus raged 
in front of our lines. The rebels, in despair, hurled their entire 
army upon the devoted Union forces, who were now outnum- 
bered by more than two to one and were greatly exhausted. 
General Granger's command, however, of three fresh brigades, 
arrived, soon after the breaking of our line of battle, from to- 
wards Eossville, and at this critical juncture they bore the brunt 
of the shock. General Stedman, the Ohio fighter, marched to a 
gap which was being attacked by Longstreet's men, with two 
of the fresh brigades, and for forty minutes the most furious 
contest of the battle took place. lie repulsed the advancing 
horde three times, with frightful slaughter, himself losing nearly 
one thousand men from his command. The rebels now gave up 
the contest and withdrew. 

Thus ended the battles of Chickamauga. The enemy were too 
severely cut up to again offer battle. Theirf desperate charges 
were led by their officers in person : hence their loss in generals, 
twelve of whom were said to be discomfited, — four of them being 
killed, four mortally and four slightly wounded. Their loss in 
colonels and subordinate officers was proportionately severe. 
The cannon of Thomas, at times, mowed down their advancing 
troops as the grass falls before the reaper. During the night of 
this last day of battle. General Thomas, not knowing what the 
enemy might attempt the next day, fell back three miles, un- 
molested, and took up a much stronger position near Eossville. 
Here the Union forces formed in line of battle, and remained 
during the next day,— Monday; and, the enemy not appearing, 
on that evening the army took up the march for Chattanooga, a 
distance of five miles, and entered it in order, with all their 
material. 



470 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

General Eosecrans, when our line was pierced, and after 
vainly attempting to stem the rebel tide with the troops at hand 
of Davies's and Sheridan's divisions, started with his attendants 
to reach General Thomas. The enemy being between them and 
that officer, and the country being of the roughest character 
imaginable, without roads or even horse-paths, the party also 
being strangers to the locality, they determined to debouch to 
the rear and gain the main road at Eossville, a distance of four 
miles, and then repair to the main army. At or near Eossville 
was a reserve force under General Granger; and the intention 
of General Eosecrans was to order this reserve forward to the 
support of Thomas forthwith. 

Arriving at Eossville, it was ascertained that Thomas was 
liolding his own, with prospects of keeping the enemy at bay 
■until night; also, that Granger's reserve had already started 
to his support. Thus, all was as yet well in that quarter. But 
General Eosecrans's attention was now drawn to Chattanooga. 
The wildest confusion reigned there and along the roads. The 
seven brigades of McCook and Crittenden, numbering perhaps 
ton thousand men, were much demoralized. In general terms, 
and to give a clear understanding of the matter to the reader, 
without pretending to accuracy in figures, we will say that 
perhaps one-half of these broken troops were halted, reformed, 
and gradually moved back to the rear of Thomas during the 
afternoon, while the remainder, numbering perhaps five thou- 
sand men, together with teamsters and the usual array of camp- 
followers and attendants, were directing their way through the 
forests and by every footpath towards Chattanooga. 

General Eosecrans was as yet uncertain of the general result. 
It was now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and appearances 
were much against him on his right. He consulted with his 
attendants, and soon decided — as would any prudent commander 
whose army was in fearful jeopardy — to aim at two points : 
first, to hold the enemy at bay, if possible, until night, and then 
to retreat into Chattanooga ; secondly, to have that place put in 
due state of defence. Having thus determined, and deeming it 



CHICKAMAUGA. 471 

most important that he should look after his rear, he despatched 
hi^ chief of staff, General Garfield, to the front, to convey intel- 
ligence and orders to General Thomas. General Eosecrans 
proceeded to the town, arriving there ahout four o'clock in the 
afternoon, and set about preparations for defence. The thou- 
sands of teams that filled the main streets in rows four and five 
deep, were ordered across the river. The stragglers were put 
to Avork, and many of them were reformed and sent back to the 
army. Breast-works were planned and commenced in the rear 
of the place, ready for a new and last line of battle, should such 
a struggle come. Our troops had been out twenty-one days, 
and their supply of rations and ammunition was nearly ex- 
hausted. The long lines of our supply trains were near Chat- 
tanooga, in the valley, ten miles distant from the main battle- 
field; and General Eosecrans w^ell knew that, were those trains 
cut off and destroyed b}" the rebel advance, our forces would be 
starved out of Chattanooga as well as fought out of it. The" 
safety of those trains, and the security of the several fords and 
of his pontoon-bridges, were not forgotten by our general in 
that hour of critical danger. Although Thomas was holding 
the greatly superior enemy in check, the latter might succeed in 
a flank movement, causing our forces to fall back to the town, 
perhaps in haste and disorder. The commander-in-chief had 
been constantly upon the battle-fields. He was most fearful of 
the failure of our right, weakened as it had been by reinforce- 
ments sent elsewhere. Throughout he was busy in receiving 
reports, despatching orders, posting troops, and personall}-^ over- 
seeing the placing of batteries. Cool, clear, and calm as an 
autumn day, and, though most anxious, j'ct hopeful, his manner, 
as upon the open fields at Stone Eiver, was cheering, and his 
words encouraging. But the country was so broken that his 
two miles of army lines were in a great measure hidden from 
his view. He was not able to judge of events upon the instant, 
nor was the ground susceptible of such action on his part as 
was exhibited upon the cotton-fields of Murfreesborough. The 
reader will remember that the line of the Chickaraauga was an 



472 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

accidental battle-field to both contending armies. It afforded 
few opportunities for the ordinary field display of gcneralshM). 
In such a contest, success lay mainly with the bravest and the 
greater numbers, accident, etc. 

General Garfield, chief of staff, proceeded to General Thomas 
and explained the condition of affairs, informing him that, if 
he deemed it advisable, he could retire the army to Eossville after 
night and there take a stronger position, or that, if necessary, 
he could come in to Chattanooga. This was Sunday night; 
and the town was, as above stated, filled with " demoralized" 
soldiers, teamsters, sutlers, and camp-followers, including, per- 
haps, we ought to add, sundry newspaper reporters. Each 
person had his own version of the scenes of the battles and of 
our "awful defeat." Those who flee invariably magnify the 
cause of their flight. While the main bulk of the glorious 
Army of the Cumberland was in good order, and successfully 
repelling the attacks of the enemy, our "Bohemian" corps — as 
represented by at least two or three of its prominent members 
— were busily engaged in shedding their befogged ideas upon 
paper, assuring the country that our army had been fighting the 
entire Southern Confederacy and had been terribly defeated. 

To show conclusively that the battle of Chickamauga was a 
necessity, that it was forced ujjon our army, let us advert to the 
dates of the various movements. General Thomas accomplished 
his march through Lookout Mountain in Bragg's rear on the 
12th of September. General McCook passed through Winston's 
Gap, and took position on the 10th. General Bi-agg evacuated 
Chattanooga on the 8th and 9th, and passed southward, in front 
of Thomas, on the 12th. McCook was ordered to retire and 
join Thomas on the 12th, which task he mainly accomplished 
by the 18th. Crittenden moved to the suj^port of Thomas on 
the 18th. Bragg issued his order to his troops, assuring them 
of reinforcements and their ability to drive "the invaders," &c. 
on the 16th, and he commenced his advance movement upon our 
army and Chattanooga on the 17th. On the 18th his pickets and 
cavalry had constant skirmishing with our forces, and on the 



CniCKAMAUGA. 473 

19tli and 20th were fought the great battles.. It will thus bo 
perceived that General Rosecraus lost uo time in marching upon 
Chattanooga and in concentrating his army, when the rebels 
assumed the offensive. 

We should here state — in justice to our subject and to indi- 
viduals — that so apparently necessary and expedient was this 
action upon the part of General Eosecrans, that not until soon after 
his x'emoval, which took place some four weeks after the battle, 
was a breath of reproach heard respecting it. One circum- 
stance, probably, tended to call attention to the fact that he 
left the battle-field before the close of the conflict, — viz. : the entry 
of Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden into Chattanooga 
without their commands. It is due to those gallant officers, than 
whom we' know none more brave and determined upon the 
field of battle, and to the officers upon their staffs, and to the 
soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland who were under their 
command, that the following facts should be made known. 

We have stated that the commands of McCook and Crittenden 
were depleted, to reinforce Thomas, at the main point of the 
battle. We have shown that their line of battle was pierced by 
the enemy at the point where their forces joined on to Thomas, 
partly through an error in the movement of a division, which 
caused a gap in the lines, and partly on account of the overwhelm- 
ing numbers of the rebel armj^, which then centred at that point, 
after having been repeatedly foiled in their attacks elsewhere. 
The reader has seen that Davis and Sheridan gallantly plunged 
into the breach with their divisions, and were quickly thrust aside 
by the advancing tide. The crumbling in pieces of those seven 
brigades amidst those forest-clad hills and valleys, in midsum- 
mer, where the foliage and unevenness of the locality precluded 
to a great extent any comprehensive view of the situation, has 
been duly commented upon. Generals McCook and Crittenden 
labored with all possible zeal and ardor to repair the disaster 
of the hour. They rode hither and thither, in various direc- 
tions, endeavoring to collect their scattered forces. They found 
their men wherever they rode, completely disorganized, some- 



474 ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

times in squads and groups, but more often singly and by twos 
and threes, all urging their way back through the thickets 
towards Chattanooga. To reform the men, xmder such circum- 
stances, was a sheer impossibility. That they attempted it, and 
made all possible exertions to retrieve the fortunes of the day, 
will, we are assured, be fully established by their official reports. 
Under the circiimstances, — it being then after three o'clock in 
the afternoon, — they deemed it advisable to repair to Chatta- 
nooga. We speak of them in connection for the sake of brevity 
only. They came in separately, neither knowing of the where- 
abouts of the other. Not until they reached the town could 
they ascertain the situation of affairs Avith General Thomas. 
They reported to General Eosecrans; and he bade them wait 
until intelligence came in from General Garfield. Upon its 
arrival, with the assurance that our army held its position 
iirmly, they returned to the front, and assisted in the falling 
back, during the night, to the new line of defence near Eoss- 
ville, and, finally, came into Chattanooga with the army. 

No complaint was uttered against these two officers by Gene- 
ral Eosecrans. The Secretary of "War, however, found reason 
for ordering their immediate suspension from their positions, 
and commanded them to appear at Indianapolis, Indiana, there 
to undergo trial as military felons. AYe have fully and candidly 
stated the facts : from them let the people of our land render 
judgment. Tlie army was surprised and shocked at this sudden 
action, attended as it was by the instant consolidation of the 
20th and 21st Army Corps. It was considered an imputation 
on the bravery of hundreds of officers and thousands of men 
in the Army of the Cumberland, too monstrous to be enter- 
tained. 



MAP or THE STKATEGIO MOVEMENT. 

To afford valuable instruction is one of the main objects of 
this volume. We have fully portrayed Avith our pen the march 



GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 475 

of the Army of the Cumberland upou Chuttiinooga. Still further 
to aid the reader, we have prepared a map with much care, upon 
which the entire movement can be traced. Let the reader turn 
to it, and accompany us in its examination. 

Our army is starting from Murfreesborough. The several blue 
lines indicate the marching of the several commands. General 
McCook's corps take to the right, and Thomas and Crittenden 
to the left; and thus they flank Bragg at Tullahoma, and he 
retreats. Our army soon pushes on, reaching Stevenson, Bridge- 
port, and Jasper. The Tennessee Ptiver is now crossed by 
McCook and Thomas, and their lines of march are readily traced 
down among the valleys and ridges and through Lookout Moun- 
tain to the rear of Bragg. The rebels evacuate; and Crittenden, 
who has meanwhile crossed the Tennessee and marched up 
towards Chattanooga, now enters that town, and then sets out 
for Einggold. It will be perceived that Bragg is now heavily 
reinforced, and turns upon Thomas and McCook. The march 
of the latter back to form a junction with the former is shown 
by the dotted blue lines. Bragg now marches for the main road 
to Chattanooga, and to get in front of our army, as is seen by 
the course of the red lines. Thomas also makes for the same 
road ; and the battle ensues. 

The reader will be amply repaid, in the study of these army 
movements, by the acquisition of knowledge respecting military 
stra.tegy accomplished ujion American soil and attended by one 
of the e-reatest battles of modern times. 



GENEEAL SUMMAEY AND CONCLUSION. 

The occupation of Chattanooga was accomplished. For seven 
months past, since the taking of Murfreesborough, this had been 
the task for our army to perform. The entire object has been 
gained; and we are quite unable to perceive wherein lies "the 
defeat," " the disaster to Eosecrans," &c. &c., that the patriotic 



476 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

people of the North and West have been solicited to believe. 
That such a wrong impression respecting a great battle could 
arise, appears almost incredible : yet, under the peculiar circum- 
stances, it may be explained. The partial occupancy of Chatta- 
nooga by Crittenden's corps Avould lead the world to believe 
that the Army of the Cumberland was there. The regretful 
thought would then arise, our army having got so snugly into 
Chattanooga, why race down among the mountains fifty miles 
to get up a fight with rebels, reinforced as they unquestionably 
would be? Some reporters stated that McCook and Thomas 
were going on to Dalton, and Atlanta, and Savannah, and 
Charleston, leaving Bragg penned up in Chattanooga with our 
army at his door ! When once understood, as we here endeavor 
to explain it, the American people will aj^preciate the fact that 
the strategic campaign of Eosecrans on Chattanooga was one 
of the most extensive, the grandest, and the most successful of 
the war. 

To show how completely deceived were very many able men 
as to our having gained Chattanooga, we copy the following 
editorial fi'om the New York " Tribune" of September last, which 
assumes that the Army of the Cumberland was then in that 
place safe and snug : — 

" Chattanooga. — The occupation of Chattanooga by General Rosecrans 
is a more brilliant success than if achieved by help of a victory. ' Battles 
are the last resort of a good general/ said one of the greatest. We are a 
little slow to believe it ; but General Rosecrans is so thorough a teacher that 
the dullest of us shall yet prove apt scholars under his instruction. The 
popular imagination delights to conceive him in the storm of bullets, amid 
which his courage and capacity turned defeat to victory at Murfreesborough. 
Magnificently done it was ; but Chattanooga is a still higher talent. Needless to 
remind ourselves that it was a famous rebel stronghold. Its impregnability 
has been vaunted in every rebel journal for a twelvemonth past. Nature 
had done her utmost to secure it from assault, and engineering science had 
trebled its natural strength. 

" General Rosecrans might have buried half his army on its craggy slopes 
before he had fought his way into its recesses ; but he turns its terrors into 
triumph by skilful strategy, and a simple flank movement discloses the 
weakness of this formidable fiistness. It is simple, however, only in the 
same sense in which nearly all grand manoeuvres are simple. They are the 
exact application of simple general principles in difficult circumstances, the 



GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 477 

natural obstacles being in this case the greatest to overcome. Rivers, moun- 
tains, impracticable roads, a country barren of supplies, — these are -what 
test a commander's capacity, and what General Rosecrans has just proved 
himself master of." 

Even by the officers and j)rivates of our army the strategy of 
their commander was very imperfectly understood at the outset, 
and it was by them grossly, though innocently, misrepresented. 
But by the time the result was attained, the whole army fully 
appreciated it, and they now consider this achievement as the 
grandest and most important of all. It is said that while riding 
along the lines after the final occupancy of the town, General 
Eosecrans thus addressed his troops in return for their cheers : — 
" Fellow-soldiers : — "We struck for Chattanooga, — we fought for 
Chattanooga, — and here we are I" 

An appreciative officer of our army (unknown to the author) 
writes as follows to friends in Wisconsin : — 

"In the Trenches at Chattanooga, > 
September 25, 18C3. J 

" My dear Uncle : — 

********* 

" The campaign I regard as one of the most brilliant and successful of the 
war. We have occupied the most important stronghold in the hands of the 
enemy against a vastly superior force. When Bragg evacuated this place, 
he expected, with the aid of large reinforcements, to take advantage of the 
weakness of our line, McCook's corps (right wing) being neai-ly forty miles 
distant from Chattanooga, where our left rested. This extension of our right 
was necessary in order to execute the flanking movement. Nothing seemed 
easier than for Bi-agg to cut us in two, and annihilate our comparatively 
small army by whipping us in detail. It was a skilfully laid and evidently 
long-matured plan of Bragg, and was foiled only by the consummate strategy 
of Rosecrans and the determined pluck of his troops. 

" The right wing marched all night, fought and marched all day, thereljy 
shifting itself to the centre before the enemy had time to strike ; the left 
wing, aided by Granger's Reserve Corps, at the same time successfully pre- 
vented the efforts of the enemy to turn our left flank and get between Rose- 
crans and Chattanooga. For three days we contended against the over- 
whelming numbers of the enemy in this disadvantageous position, when 
Rosecrans finally succeeded in concentrating his army, saving his trains, and 
in occupying Chattanooga — the coveted position — in such force as to insure 
its permanent possession. 

"The object of the campaign has been fully accomplished, and we have 
had to contend with much greater difficulties than ever we anticipated. The 



478 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

enemy has been baffled and ovitvvitted ; lie has gained no e^mpensating 
advantage for the loss of Chattanooga in any way ; and I believe that his loss 
in killed, wounded, and prisoners is even heavier than ours. We in the army 
can appreciate better than you at home the genius of our commander in 
extricating us from our perilous position." 

That officer could not liave stated the case more clearly had 
he had his genei'al's maps and notes in hand. 

G eneral Eosecrans's official report admits a loss (displacement) 
of sixteen thousand men, and General Bragg officially confesses 
to a loss of seventeen thousand. The Union commander an- 
nounces in the same report that the enemy took four thousand 
nine hundred of our men prisoners, including the Avounded 
on the battle-field; while we took two thousand rebel prisoners, 
none of them wounded. 

As regards the extent of the rebel forces at the battles of 
Chickamauga, General Eosecrans assumes that they had at least 
seventy thousand men, upon this basis. We took prisoners from 
one hundred and fifty-three rebel consolidated regiments. They 
will average four hundred men to each regiment, — sixty-two 
thousand. Add to this at least eight thousand men for artillery. 
The rebel prisoners generally concurred in that estimate. 

The Marietta (formerly Chattanooga) " Eebel," soon after the 
battle, stated that Bragg was " surx-ounded by a galaxy of higher 
military talent and backed by a larger army than he ever before 
commanded during his whole military career." 

"When the rebel newspapers gave the names of their generals 
who were killed, it was easy to see to what extent reinforce- 
ments had been sent to Bragg. Hood's, McLaws's, and Gregg's 
divisions — the two former of Longstreet's and the latter of 
Ewell's coi"ps — are represented in their list of officers killed and 
wounded. The tAvo divisions out of three of Longstreet's corps 
show forty-two regiments and about fifteen thousand men. 
Gregg's division, which is the third of Ewell's corps, numbers 
about ten thousand men. Thus Lee sent to Bragg from tAventy- 
five thousand to thirty-one thousand men. When Ave add to this 
Bragg's original army, SAvelled by conscripts to at least thirty-five 
thousand men, ten thousand men under Buckner, together Avith 



GENERAL SUMMARY~AND CONCLUSION. 479 

material reinforcements from Johnston and Pemberton's old 
armies, the latter having been declared released from their 
paroles given at Vicksbui-g, the magnitude of Bragg's army is 
-wqU established. B. F. Taylor, Esq., who is now with the Army 
of the Cumberland as the war-correspondent of the Chicago 
" Journal," Avrites to that paper under recent date (October) as 
follows : — 

" The business before us is formidable, — how formidable I fear the 
country does not quite appreciate. No such enemy ever sat down before a 
Federal hold, no such host ever before looked us face to face. No such 
stake has been ever before to be played for. One hundred thousand seasoned 
men will not exhaust the rebel roll. We here shall see the most terrible battle 
ever fought on this continent." 

The value of the results of the campaign for Chattanooga is 
now universally recognized. The following, from the Knoxville 
"Eegister," at present published at Atlanta, Georgia, shows how 
important the rebels feel it to be to recapture East Tennessee : — 

" If any one doubts the necessity vrhich would impel President Davis to 
sacrifice Richmond, Charleston, and Mobile, all to reacquire East Tennessee, 
he need only ask the Commissary-General by what agencies and from 
what source the armies of the South have been sustained during the first 
year of the vrar. East Tennessee furnished the Confederate States with 
twenty-five millions of pounds of bacon. Last year the State of Tennessee 
fed the army." 

And says the Eichmond " Examiner" of October 31 : — 

" For a long time the importance of East Tennessee to the Confederacy 
seemed to be unappreciated. Not until that country fell into the possession 
of the enemy was its incalculable value realized. Except what was furtively 
obtained from Kentucky, the whole army supply of pork came from East 
Tennessee and the contiguous counties of the adjoining States. The product 
of corn in that region was very heavy, and no portion of the Confederacy, 
equal in extent, afforded as large a supply of forage and winter pasturage. 
The occupation of East Tennessee by our own armies was not only import- 
ant in itself, but it was important also in respect to the contiguous country 
which it protected. A great line of railway was secured, continental in 
its dimensions and in its value. The saline and lead mines of Virginia, 
which produce all the salt and lead used in the Confederacy, were protected 
so long as East Tennessee was ours. 

" But the evacuation of that region, and its surrender without a single 
battle to the enemy, has lost us all these advantages. The railway is broken 



480 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

up, and there can be no communication between General Jones at Bristol 
and General Bragg at Chickamauga, who are less than one hundred and fifty 
miles apart, except by a circuit of twelve hundred miles through Petersburg, 
the Carolinas, and Augusta. The hogs of East Tennessee, affording twenty- 
five millions of pounds of pork, are now being slaughtered for the Yankee 
armies. The vast corn-crops and forage-supplies of that department, suflEi- 
ciont to winter all the live stock of the Confederate armies, are being fed to the 
fifty thousand horses and mules belonging to the forces of Grant. The salt and 
lead works of the Confederacy, and the numberless caves of Southwestern 
Virginia, from which immense supplies of saltpetre are obtained for the 
Ordnance Department, are now imminently threatened by the close presence 
of hostile armies, requiring the presence of heavy forces of our own for their 
protection." 

After gaining Chattanooga, General Eosecrans vigorously 
puslied forward his earth-works in the rear. As at Corinth, at 
Nashville, and at Murfreesborough, he at once prepared to stay, 
and to make the place an extensive military depot. During four 
weeks he labored incessantly and effectively. 

Notwithstanding the false impressions already mentioned, as 
to our " defeat," " disaster," and to our being " out-generalled," 
&c., the Union patriots of our land honored our army and its 
commander as greatly as ever, for the last di8j)lay of their labor, 
their fortitude, and their bravery. It was not, therefore, on ac- 
count of any public dissatisfaction that General Eosecrans was 
relieved from his command. The order came to him, unan- 
nounced, at four o'clock p.m. on the 19th day of October. At 
nine o'clock that evening he turned over his army to his old and 
tried friend and confidant. General Thomas. Desiring to have 
no commotion in the army, he prepared the following order to 
be issued after his departure, and at eight o'clock the next morn- 
ing, October 20, just one year to a day from the time of his leav- 
ing his army at Corinth, Mississippi, to take this command, he 
bade farewell to the Army of the Cumberland : — 

" General Orders, No. 242. 

"Head-Quarters Department of the Cumberland, "J 
" Chattanooga, Tenn., October 19, 1863. / 

" The general commanding announces to the ofiBcers and soldiers of the 
Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them, under orders from the President. 



GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 481 

" Major-Genoral Georgo H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume 
the command of this army and department. 

" The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him. 

" In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms, — officers and soldiers, — he 
congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you, as he did, a 
stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its first 
organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, 
dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence that 
under God he will lead you to victory. 

" The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves 
and your country in the future as you have been in the past. 

" To the division and brigade commanders he tenders his cordial thanks 
for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken. 

" To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates whom he 
leaves behind he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring 
devotion to duty. 

" Companions in arms, — officers and soldiers, — farewell ; and may God 
bless you ! 

" W. S. RosECRANS, Major- General.^' 

The causes of this action on the part of the Government have 
not been made public ; but it is the duty of all patriots to pre- 
sume that they are ample. Injurious and defamatory reports 
against General Eosecrans have arisen in this connection to die 
almost as soon as born. The author passes them by unnoticed 
farther than to leave them to be refuted by the enemy. 

From the Richmond "Examiner," October 26. 

" Meantime, Lincoln is helping us. He has removed from command the 
most dangerous man in his army. A variety of mean and damaging pre- 
texts for Rosecrans's removal have been published by the Yankee press. 
But the true reason is the fact that he failed at Chickamauga. 

********* 

"Rosecrans thus retired is unquestionably the greatest captain the Yan- 
kee nation has yet produced. His performances in the field are too fresh in 
the memory of every reader to necessitate recapitulation. We may, how- 
ever, mention, in proof of his intellectual ability, that he graduated fifth at 
West Point in a class of fifty-six, in which General G. W. Smith graduated 
eighth and Longstreet fifty-fourth." 

The gigantic efforts now being made by the rebels to recover 
Chattanooga audits concomitant, East Tennessee, and the deter- 
mination of the Federal Government to retain it, best attest the 
value of General Eosecrans's last campaign. As we have re- 
marked of his strategic and bloodless victory at Tullahoma, so 

31 



482 ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

we may claim of Chattanooga, that, had he attacked and stormed 
it in front at a cost of five thousand of his soldiers, the world 
would hail it as a glorious and substantial victory. The result 
of the campaign is the same, — Chickamauga was the inevitable 
price of Chattanooga. 

Thus we close our history of the Army of the Cumberland. 
To its future, under its wise and beloved leader, General Thomas, 
are committed, to a great extent, the hojjes of the patriots of our 
land. May those hopes be gloriously and speedily fulfilled ! 

The theatre of war is now apparently changed; and upon the 
Georgia frontier are to be witnessed the culminating scenes of 
the rebellion. The Union armies are there assembling under 
the direction of Major-General Grant, the successful hero of 
Fort Donelson and Vicksburg. The next campaign of this 
grand ai*my of the Union, thus commanded, will constitute an 
epoch in the history of our nation and of the world. 



GEOsr. :RosECK^isrs 



a I' B ilk X:^ >"£ 



(Iim\i(i^KlkmikU(^k C AMW ^ A> II Q l««, 



704 THE CHICKAMAUOA CAMPAinx 



dieneral llosc^rans's llc|?ort of the dhichamaucja Campiigu. 



Head-Quarters Army of tuk Cumberland, October V2. IROO. 

REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBER- 
LAND—THE OCCUPATION OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE, AND PASSAGE 
OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS. 

The rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cum- 
berland Mountains, by way of the Tantallon and University Roads, then moved 
down Battle Creek and crossed the Tennessee River, on bridges, it is said, near 
the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Kelly's Ferry, and on the railroad bridge, at 
Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter, after having passed over it, 
and retired to Chattanooga and Tyner Station, leaving guards along the river. 
On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up 
some defensive field-works at that place, and also at each of the crossings of the 
Tennessee, as far up as Blythe's Ferry. 

Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the 
roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, 
with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to 
Bridgeport, in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not in 
time to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge. 

After the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Middle Tennessee, the next ob- 
jective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern en- 
trance into East Tennessee, the most valuable, if not the chief, sources of sup- 
plies of coal for the manufactories and machine-shops of the Southern States, 
and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the campaign coun- 
ties of Georgia and Alabama. 

For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the 
topography «f the country from llie barrens of the northwestern base of the 
Cumberiaml llangp, to Chattanooga and its vicinity. 

The Cumberland Range is a lotty mass of rocks separating the waters which 
flow into tlie Cumberland from those wliich flow into the Tennessee, and ex- 
fending from beyond the Kentucky line in a southwesterly direction nearly lo 
.Vthens, Alabama. Its northwestern slopes are steep and rocky and scalloped 
in coves, in which are tlie heads of numerous streams that water Middle Ten- 
nessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively 
liarren, anil in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its southeastern 
slope above ('hattanooga for many miles is precipitous, rough, and difficult all 
the way up to Kingston. The valley between tlie foot of this slope and the 
river seldom exceeds four or five miles in width, and, with the exception of a 
narrow border along tlie banks, is undulating or liilly. 

The Secjuatchie Valley is along the river of tliat name, and is a cafion or deep 
cut splitting the Cumberland Range, parallel to its length. It is only three or 
four miles in breadtli, and fifty miles in length. The sides of this valley are 
even more precipitous tlian tiie great oastern-and-western slopes of the Cum- 
berland, whicli have just been describcMl. To reach Chattanooga from McMinn- 
ville, or north of tlie Tennessee, it is necessary to turn the head of this Valley 
of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Thurmau. 



OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 705 

That part of the Cumbevlnnd Range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, 
called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high rocky bluifs, having no 
practicable space sufficient for a good wagon-road along the river. The Nash- 
ville & Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland Range 
west of the Sequatchie, through ai low gap, by a tunnel east of Cowan, down 
the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, at the foot of the mountain, on the 
Memphis & Charleston Railroad, three miles from the Tennessee and ten 
miles from Bridgeport. 

Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two 
ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumber- 
land, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain-masses, which, in 
those places, abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a 
narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek. 

The Sand Mountains are next to the Tennessee, and their southern extremity 
is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous, and its top barren oak 
ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, 
wagon-roads by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain. 

East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain, a vast palisade of rocks, rising 
twenty-four hundred feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt rocky cliffs, from 
a steep, wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies 
from one to six or seven miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, 
and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, two miles 
below Chattanooga, and the only practicable roads across it are one over the 
nose of the mountain at this point, one at Johnson's Crook, twenty-six miles 
distant, and one at Winston's Gap, forty-two miles distant from Chattanooga. 

Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga & 
Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad, are a series of narrow valleys, separated by 
smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number 
of practicable wagon-roads running eastward towards the railroad. The first 
of these ranges is Mission Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from 
Chattanooga Creek. A higher range, with fewer gaps, on the southeast side 
of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near 
Dougherty's Gap, some forty miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a 
northerly direction, bearing eastward, until it is lost in the general level of the 
country, near the line of the Chattanooga & Lafayette Road. 

East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ottawah 
and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, 
rocky range, traversable by wagon-roads only through gaps, generally several 
miles apart. 

Mission Ridge passes about three miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the 
Tennessee, at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the 
East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga & Atlanta Rail- 
road. 

The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge 
and west of the rough mountain-region in which are the sources of tlie Coosa 
River. This valley, only about nine or ten miles wide, is the natural southern 
gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate 
northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwardly 
direction towards the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the 
crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest. 

From the position of our army at McMinnville, TuUahoma, Decherd, and 
Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was neces- 
sary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley by Pikeville or Kingston, 
or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or 
Thurman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a 
distance of sixty-five or seventy miles, over a country destitute of forage and 
poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon-roads. 

The main Cumberland range could also have been passed on an inferior road 
by Pelham and Tracy City, to Thurman. The most southerly route on which 
to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was 
by Cowan University, Battle Creek, and Jasper, or by Tantallon, Anderson, 

45 



TOG THE cnicKAMAUGA campaign: 

Stevenson, or Bridgeport and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and 
thence by Tliurm.in or Dunhip and Poo's Tavern, across Walden's Ridge. The 
University road, though difficult, was tlie best of these two; that by Cowan, 
Tantallon, and Stevenson being vei'y rough between Cowau and Anderson, and 
much longer. 

There were, also, three roads aci'oss to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, 
— the best, but much the longest, by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of 
seventy miles; the next, a verj"^ rough wagon-road from Winchester, by Sa- 
lem, to Larkinsville ; and an exceedingly rough road by way of Mount Top, 
one branch leading thence to Bellefont, and the other to Stevenson. 

On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found, except at the ex- 
tremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens 
has both forage and water in abundance. 

It is evident, from this descrijjtion of the topography, that to reach Chatta- 
nooga or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the 
Tennessee below Chattanooga, was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross 
the Cumbei-land iMountains with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited 
supply of forage, and a bridge-train, to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into 
liOokout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges of Mis- 
sion Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga, or Mission Ridge, Pigeon 
Rlountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton or south of 
it. The valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth be- 
tween the bases of the mountains below Bi'idgeport, is not a broad alluvial 
farming-country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a 
small part of it under cultivation. 

The first step was to repair the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, to bring 
forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Decherd, and Winchester needful forage 
and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesborough to 
those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to 
Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson 
and Bridgeport, and the Tracy City Branch, so that we could place supplies in 
the depots at those points, from which to di-aw after we had crossed the moun- 
tains. 

Through Colonel Innis and his regiment of Michigan Engineers, the main 
road was opened to the Elk River bridge by the 13th of July, and Elk River 
bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the 25th, and the branch to Tracy 
City by the 13th of August. 

As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridan's division was 
advanced, two brigades, to Bridgeport, and one to Stevenson, and quarter- 
master and commissary stores pushed forward to the latter place with all 
practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in 
sufficient quant-ties by the 8th of August, and corps commanders were that 
day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage 
sufficient for a general movement. 

The Tracy Citj' Branch, built for bringing the coal down the mountains, has 
such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only 
one we had answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nash- 
ville, was not repaired until about the 12th of August. It was deemed best, 
therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely 
available for transporting stores to Tracy City. 

The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on the morning of the 
16th of August, as follows: — 

General (.'rittenden's corps, in three columns: General Wood, from Hillsbo- 
rough, by Pelham, to Thurman, in Sequatchie Valley. 

General Palmer, from Manchester, by the most practicable route, to 
Dunlap. 

General Van Cleve, with two brigades from McMinnville, the third being left 
in garrison there, by the most practicable route, to Pikeville, the head of 
Sequatchie Valley. 

Colonel Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, to drive back Detrel's 
cavalry towards Kingston, where the enemy's mounted troops under Forrest 



OFFICIAL RErORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 707 

were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's column, to 
proceed to Pikeville. 

The 14th Army Corps, Major-General George H. Thomas commanding, moved 

as follows : — ^ i . , i 

General Reynolds, from University, by way of Battle Creek, to take post 
concealed near its mouth. 

Genei-al Brannau to follow him. 

General Negley to go by Tantallon, and halt on Crow Creek, between Ander- 
son and Stevenson. 

General Baird to follow him and camp near Anderson. 

The 20th Corps, Major-General A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as 
follows: — 

General .Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont. 

General Davis by ^Slount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson. 

The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line 
of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up. 

On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a 
brigade of infantry to reconnoitre the Tennessee, near Harrison's Landing, 
and^'take post at Poe's Cross-Roads; Minty was to reconnoitre from Washing- 
ton down and take post at Smith's Cross-Roads; and Wilder's brigade of 
mounted infantry was to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga, 
and be supported by a brigade of infantry which General Crittenden was to 
send from Thurman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, in front 
of Chattanooga. 

These movements were completed by the evening of the liUth ot August. 
Hazen's brigade' made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported 
the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poe's Cross-Roads on the 
21st. Wagner, with his brigade, supported Wilder in his reconnoissance on 
Chattanooga, which they surprised and shelled from across the river, creating 
no little agitation. Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it 
and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the 

TcnilGSSGG 

The crossing of the river required that the best points should be chosen, 
.and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitred; the pon- 
toons and trains were ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view 
in the rear of Stevenson, and prepared for use. By the time they were ready, 
the places of crossing had been selected, and dispositions made to begin the 
operation. It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment the points of 
crossino-; but, as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in pre- 
cipitou^, rocky bluffs, to the height of eight hundred or a thousand feet, com- 
pletely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible. 

Not having pontoons for two bridges ^across the river, General Shcrida^n 
began trestle-work for parts of one at Bridgeport, while General Reynolds's 
division seized Shellmound, captured some boats, and from these, and material 
picked up, prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan 
prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek. 

The laying of the pontoon-bridge at Caperton's Ferry was very handsomely 
done by the troops of General Davis, under the direction of General McCook, 
who crossed his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemy's cavalry 
from the opposite side. The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the 2;ith of 
August; but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion until Sep- 
t GUI I) or li. 

The movement across the river was commenced August 29, and completed on 
the 4th of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and 
depot at Stevenson until relieved by Mnjor-General Granger, who was directed, 
as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear. ^ 

General Thomas's corps was to cross as follows: one division at Caperton s, 
one at Bridgeport, Reynolds's at Shellmound, in boats, and one division at 
Battle Creek, on rafts. All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such por- 
tions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near 
Trenton, and send an advance to Frick's, Cooper's, and Stevens's Gaps on the 



708 THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: 

Lookout Mountain — the only i^racticable routes lading down the mountains 
into the valley called McLemore's Cove, which lies at its base and stretches 
northeastwardly towards Chattanooga. General McCook's corps was to cross, 
— two divisions at Capertou's Ferry, — move to the valley head and seize 
AVinston's Gap, while Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport as soon as the bridge 
was laid, and join the rest of bis corps near Winston's, by way of Trenton. 

General Crittenden was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving two advance 
brigades, under llazen and Wagner, with Minty's cavalry and AVilder'.s mounted 
infantry, to watch and annoy the enemy. He was to cross the river, following 
Thomas's corps at the crossing, and to take post on the Murphy's Hollow 
Road, ]>ushing an advance brigade to reconnoitre the enemy at the foot of 
Lookout, and take post at Wauhatchie, communicating from its main body with 
Thomas on the right, up the Trenton Valley and threatening Chattanooga by 
passing over the point of Lookout. 

The cavalry, ci'ossing at Caperton's and a ford near Island Creek, were to 
unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville and reconnoitre boldly 
towards Rome and Alpine. 

These movements were completed by McCook's and Ci'ittenden's corps on the 
Gth, and by Thomas's corps on the 8th of September. The cavalry, for some 
reason, was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the 
necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that 
period, and the absence of Major-General Stanley, Chief of Cavalry, have 
prevented the report which may throw some light on the subject. 

The first barriers south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found 
firmly holding the point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, 
while our forces on the north side of the river reported the movements of the 
rebel forces from East Tennessee and their concentration at Chattanooga. To 
dislodge him from that place, it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or 
so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of 
communication. The latter plan was chosen. 

The cavalry were ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville, 
in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the move- 
ment by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine. It 
was executed on the 8th and 9th of September. 

General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Prick's, Cooper's, and 
Stevens's Gaps, and occupy the head of McLemore's Cove. General Critten- 
den was ordered to reconnoitre the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a bri- 
gade up an almost impracticable path, called Nickajack Trace, to Summertown, 
a hamlet on the summit of the mountain, overlooking Chattanooga, and hold- 
ing the main body of his corps either to support these reconnoissances, to 
prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chatta- 
nooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but a feeble resistance. 
Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry were ordered to piisli by way 
of Alpine and Broomtown Valley and strike the enemy's railroad-communica- 
tion between Resaca Bridge and Dalton. 

This movement was promptly begun on the 8th and 9th of September. The 
reconnoissance of Genei-al Crittenden on the 9th developed the fact that the 
enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous; and his advance 
took peaceable possession at one o'clock p.m. His whole corps, with its 
trains, passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the 10th, and camped 
for the night at Rossville. five miles south of Chattanooga. 

During these operations, General Thomas pushed his corps over the moun- 
tains at the designated points. Each division consumed two days in the pass- 
age. The weight of evidence gathered from all sources, was, that Bragg was 
moving on Rome, and that his movements began on the 6th of September. 
General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga with one bri- 
gade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to 
follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had 
retired by Ringgold and Dalton. Additional information obtained during the 
afternoon and evening of the 10th of September rendered it certain that his 
main body retired by the Lafayette road, but uncertain whether he had gone 



OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 709 

far. General Crittenden was ordered, at one o'clock a.m. on the lltL, to pro- 
ceed to the front, and report, directing his command to advance only as far as 
Ringgold and order a reconnoissance to Gordon's Mills. His report, and fur- 
ther evidence, satistied me that the main body of the rebel army were in the 
vicinity of Lafayette. General Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his 
corps, with all possible despatch, from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, and com- 
municate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the eastern foot 
of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringgold on the 11th, 
pushing Wilder's mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily 
with the enemy's cavalry. Hazen joined him near Ringgold on the 11th. and 
the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordon's Mills on 
the 12th. Wilder, following, and covering the movement, had a severe fight 
with the enemy at Sill's Tan-Yard. 

During the same day the 4th U.S. Cavalry were ordered to move past the 
Dry Valley road to discover if the enemy was in proximity to that road on 
Crittenden's right, and open communication with Thomas's command, which, 
passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, 
and moving on Lafayette through Dry Gap of the Pigeon Mountain. On the 
10th, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dry Gap, which they 
heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morn- 
ing of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon 
liim in heavy force, and, perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position 
he would probably be cut off, he fell back, after a sharp skirmish in which 
General Baird's division participated, skilfully covering and securing their 
trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap. 

On the 13th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move, promptly closed 
up to the support of these two advance divisions. During the same day. Gene- 
ral McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, 
had reconnoitred the Broomtown "Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that 
the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was coucenti-ating at Lafayette. 
Thei-e it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both 
infantry and cavalry, upon the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of Lafayette, 
while two corps of this army were at Gordon's Mills, Bailey's Cross-Roads at 
the foot of Stevens's Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of fifty miles from flank to 
flank by the nearest practicable roads, and fifty-seven miles by the route sub- 
sequently taken by the 20th Corps. It had already been ascertained that the 
main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evi- 
dence showed that the troops from "Virginia had reached Atlanta on the 1st 
of the month, and that reinforcements were expected soon to arrive from that 
quarter. It was, therefore, a matter of life and death to effect a concentration 
of the army. 

General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, and 
was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Dougherty's Gap, and to join 
General Thomas, with the remainder of his command, with the utmost celerity, 
directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had already, 
with great prudence, moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the 
mountain, but, unfortunately, being ignorant of the mountain-road, moved 
down the mountain at "Winston's Gap, down Lookout Valley and Cooper's Gap, 
up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th, 
and having posted Davis at Brooks's, in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pound 
Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens's Gap. 

As soon as General McCook's corps ai-rived. General Thomas moved down the 
Chickamauga, towards Gordon's Mills. Meanwhile, to bring General Critten- 
den within reach of General Thomas and beyond the danger of separation, he 
was withdrawn from Gordon's Mills on the 14th, and ordered to take post om 
the southern spur of Mission Ridge, his right communicating with General 
Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with 
General Thomas. 

Minty, with his cavalry, reconnoitred the enemy on the 15th, and repulsed 
him in force at Dalton, Ringgold. Letts, and Rockspring Church. The head of 
General McCook's column near the same place, General Crittenden was ordered 



710 THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: 

to return to hold possession at Gordon's Mills, his line resting along the Chicka- 
iriauga, by way of Crawfish Springs. 

Tlius, on the evening of the 17th, the troops were substantially within sup- 
porting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line, in the 
order of battle, down the Chickauiauga, with a view of covering the Lafayette 
road towards Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's 
front. The position of our troops and the narrowness of tlie roads retarded 
our movements. During the day, while tliey were in progress, our cavalry, 
under Colonel Minty, was attacked on the left in the road. It became ap- 
parent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reed's and 
Alexander's bridges in force, while he had threatened Gordon's Mills. Orders 
were, therefore, promptly given to General Thomas to relieve General Critten- 
den's corps, posting one division near Crawfish Springs, and to move with the 
remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenn's house to Ilossville and the La- 
fayette road, bis left extending obliquely across it near Kelley's house. Gene- 
ral Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleve and Palmer's divisions to 
draw the enemy from tlie Ilossville road and form on the left of General Wood, 
ihen at Gordon's Mills. 

General Md'ook's corps was to close up to General Thomas, keep the position 
at Crawfish Springs, and protect General Crittenden's right, wliile holding his 
corps mainly in reserve. The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on 
General McCook's right, watch the crossing of the Cliickamauga, and act 
under liis orders. The movement for the concentration of the corps more com- 
pactly towards Crawfish Springs was begun on the morning of the 18th under 
orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCook's 
corps only reached Pound Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their 
arms during tlie night. Crittenden's corps reached its position on the Ross- 
ville road near midnight. 

Evidence accumulated, during the day of the 18th, that the enemy was 
moving to our left. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted brigade encoun- 
tered the enemy's cavalry at Reed's and Alexander's bridges towards evening, 
and were driven in to tlie Rossville road. At the same time, the enemy had 
been demonstrating for three miles u^j the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust 
had been observed three or four miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to 
the northwest. 

In view of all these facts, the necessity became apparent that General Thomas 
must use all possible despatch in moving liis corps to the position assigned him. 
He was therefore directed to proceed with all despatch, and General McCook to 
close up to Crawfish Springs as soon as Thomas's column was out of the way. 
Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and by daylight the 
head of his column had reached Kelley's house, on the Lafayette road, where 
Baird's division was posted. Brannan followed, and was posted on Baird's left, 
crossing the road leading to Reed's and Alexander's bridges. 

At this point. Colonel McCook, of General Granger's corps, who had made a 
reconnoissance to the Chickamauga the evening befoi'e and had burned Reed's 
bridge, met General Thomas, and reported that an isolated brigade of the 
enemy was this side of the Chickamauga, and, the bridge being destroyed, a 
rapid movement in that direction miglit result in the capture of the force thus 
isolated. General Thomas ordered Brannan, with two brigades, to reconnoitre 
in that direction ami attack any small force he should meet. The advance 
brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body 
of the enemy, attacked it vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, 
where a vory strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention 
of turning our left and gaining possession of the Lafayette road between us and 
Chattanooga. This vigorous movement disconcerted the plan of the enemy to 
move on our left, and opened the battle of the 19th of September. 

The leading brigade became engaged at about ten o'clock a.m. on the 10th, 
on our extreme left, extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move 
in heavy masses. Apprehending tliis movement, I had ordered General McCook 
to send Johnson's division to Tliomas's assistance ; and he arrived opportunely. 

General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already despatched Palmer's 



OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 711 

division, reporting the fact to me, and receiving my approval. Tlie enemy 
returned our attack, and was driving back Baird's riglit in disorder, when 
Johnson struck the attacking column in flank, and drove it back more than 
half a mile, until his own right was overlapped and in imminent danger of being 
turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnson's right, threw his division against 
the enemy and drove back his advancing columns. Palmer's right was soon 
overlapped, when Van Cleve's division came to his support, but was beaten 
back, when Reynolds's division came in, and was, in turn, overpowered. Davis's 
division came into the fight then most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who 
soon, however, developed superior force against his line, and pressed him so 
heavily that he was giving ground, when Wood's division came, and turned the 
tide of battle the other way. 

About three p.m., General McCook was ordered to send Sheridan's division 
to the support of our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytle's brigade to 
hold Gordon's Mills, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to 
save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly stayed in that 
quarter. 

Meanwhile, the roar of musketry on our centre grew louder, and the battle 
approached head-quarters at Widow Glenn's house, until musket-balls came near 
and shells bui:st about it. Our centre was being driven. Orders were sent to 
General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Springs and above, where 
he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenn's, to be held 
in reserve, to give support wherever it might be required. At half-past four p.m. 
he reported with his division ; and, as the indications that our centre was being 
driven became clearer, he was despatched in that direction, and soon found the 
enemy had dislodged Van Cleve from the line, and was forming there even 
while Thomas was driving their right. Orders were promptly given Negley 
to attack him, which he soon did, driving him steadily until night closed the 
combat. 

General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy on the extreme left, was sent 
by General Thomas to support the centre and at night assume the position on 
the right of Reynolds. Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry occupied 
during the day a position on the Lafayette road, one mile north of Gordon's 
Mills, where he had tarken position on the afternoon previous, — when, contesting 
the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemy's advance from 
Alexander's bridge. Minty's cavalry had been ordered from the same position 
about noon of the 19th, to report to General Granger at Rossville, which he did 
at daylight on the 20th, and was posted near Mission Mills to hold in check the 
enemy's cavalry on their right, from the direction of Ringgold and Graysville. 

The reserve corps covered the approaches from the Cliickamauga towards 
Rossville on our left. The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and 
our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on 
their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, 
and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chat- 
tanooga, — the great object of the battle of the 19th of September. The 
battle had secured us these objects ; our flank covered the Dry Valley and 
Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Mission Ridge and the valley of 
Chickamauga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on 
Friday, the 18th. 

We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps' and 
Johnston's forces by the capture of prisoners from each ; and the fact that at the 
close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been in action, 
opposed to the superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were 
greatly outnumbered, and that the battle of the next day must be for the safety 
of the army and the possession of Chattanooga. 

During the evening of the 19th, the corps commanders were assembled at 
head-quarters at Widow Glenn's house. The reports of the position and con- 
dition of their commands were heard, and orders given for the disposition of 
the troops on the following day. Thomas's corps, with the troops which had 
reinforced him, was to maintain, substantially, its present line with Brannan 
in resei-ve. McCook, maintaining his picket-line until it was driven in, was to 



712 THE CUICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN : 

close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's 
house; and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of 
McCook's and Thomas's lines, to be able to support either. Plans having been 
explained and written, advice given to each and read in the presence of all, 
the weary corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands. No 
firing took place during the night, and the troops had assumed position when 
day dawned. The sky was red and sultry, and the atmosphere of the woods 
enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light, 1 proceeded, 
accompanied by General Garfield and some aides, to inspect the lines. 

I found General McCook's right too far upon the crest, and General Davis in 
reserve upon a hillside west of and parallel to the Di-y Valley road. I men- 
tioned these defects to the general, desiring Davis's division to be brought down 
at once, moved more to the left, and placed in close column, by division doubled 
on the centre, in a sheltered position. 

I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill, 
in the valley, and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved farther 
to the left. 

General Thomas's troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line, 
which was to be closed more compactly. 

Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were 
despatched to General Negley to join General Thomas, and to General McCook 
to relieve Negley. Returning to the right, I found Negley had not moved, nor 
were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to 
withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve 
brigade immediately, and follow it with the others only when relieved in line 
of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill 
General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order, 
growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas. Proceed- 
ing to the extreme right, I felt the disadvantages of its position, mentioned 
them to General McCook, and, when I left him, enjoined on him that it was an 
indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must 
do so at all hazards. On my return to the position of General Negley, I found, 
to my astonishment, that General Crittenden had not relieved him, AVood's 
division having reached the position of Negley's reserve. Peremptorj' orders 
were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position; but this 
delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. The battle began on the 
extreme left at half-past eight a.m., and it was half-past nine o'clock when 
Negley was relieved. 

An aide arriving from General Thomas, requesting that Negley's remaining 
brigades be sent forward as speedily as possible to succor the left. General 
Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve with all possible despatch to a 
position in the rear of Wood, who closed in on Brannan's right. General 
i\IcCook was ordered to move Davis up to close in on Wood and fill an opening 
in the line. 

On my return from an examination of the ground in the rear of our right 
and left centre, I found, to my surprise, that General Van Cleve was posted in 
line of battle on a high ridge, much too far to the I'ear to give immediate sup- 
port to the main line of battle, and General Davis in line of battle in rear of 
the ridge occupied by Negley's reserve in the morning. General Crittenden 
was ordered to move Van Cleve at once down the hill to a better position, and 
General Davis was also ordered to close up to the support of the line near 
Wood's right. The battle in the mean time roared with increasing furj^ and 
approached from the left to the centre. Two aids arrived successively within a 
few minutes from General Thomas, asking for reinforcements. The first was 
directed to say that General Negley had already gone, and should be nearly at 
hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The 
other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to 
his assistance, which was accordingly done. 

A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily pressed. 
Captain Kellog, A.D.C., the bearer, informing me at the same time that General 
Brannan was out of line and General Reynolds's right was exposed. Orders 



OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 713 

■were despatclied to Genex'al Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent 
to General Thomas that he should be supported even if it took away the whole 
corps of Crittenden and McCook. 

General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook 
was advised of the state of afiairs, and ordered to close his whole command 
to the left with all despatch. 

General Wood, overlooking the direction to "close up" on General Reynolds, 
supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to 
the rear of General Brannan, Avho, it appears, was not out of line, but was in 
echelon and slightly in rear of ReA'nolds's right. By this unfortunate mistake a 
gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advan- 
tage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear as well as in front, threw his wliole 
division into confusion. The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood 
before it had cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and 
two of his batteries then in movement to a new position were taken in flauk 
and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the 
left, throwing his division into confusion, from which it never recovered until 
it reached Rossville. 

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line, stretching beyond 
Sheridan's right, was advancing. Laibold's brigade shared in the rout of 
Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement towards the left, under 
orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing 
column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their 
flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying in the Dry Valley 
road and repulsing the enemy, but were again compelled to yield to superior 
numbers, and retired westward of the Dry Valley, and, by a circuitous route, 
reached Rossville, from which they advanced, by the Lafayette road, to supj^ort 
our left. 

Thus, Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire divi- 
sion, were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of Baird, John- 
son, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades, and one 
of Van Cleve's, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of 
the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their 
whole eiforts to destroy them. 

At the moment of the repulse of Davis's division, I was standing in rear of 
his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook to the left. Seeing 
confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis's men were falling 
back, and the tide of battle surging towards us, the urgency for Sheridan's 
troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme 
right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It 
was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy ad- 
vanced. Giving the troops direction to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry 
Valley road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMi- 
chael, and Major Bond, of my stafi", and a few of the escort, under a shower 
of grape and canister and musketry, for two or three hundred yards, and 
attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by 
passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed 
troops far towards the left ; and, hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and 
cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started 
for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined 
to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for 
the security of the pontoon-bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to 
make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies 
should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position. 

General Garfield despatched me from Rossville that the left and centre still 
held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support. General Sheridan 
bad rallied his division, and was advancing towards the same point, and General 
Davis was going up the Dry Valley road, to our right. General Garfield pro- 
ceeded to the front, remained there until the close of the fight, and despatched 
me the triumphant defence our troops there made against the assaults of the 
enemy. 



714 THE CIIICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: 

The fight on the left, after two p.m., was that of the army. Never, in thf 
history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater energy and deter 
mination. Bayonet-charges, often heard of, but seldom seen, were repeatedly 
niaae by brigades and regiments, in several of our divisions. 

After the yielding and severance of the divisions on the right, the enemy 
made all efl'orts to break the solid portions of our line. Under the pressure of 
the rebel onset, the Hanks of the line were gradually retired until they occu- 
pied strong advantageous ground. 

From one to half-past three o'clock, the unequal contest was sustained 
throughout our line. Then the enemy, in overpowering numbers, flanked 
around -our right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge 
of our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was critical. 
Twenty minutes more, and our light would have been turned, our position taken 
in reverse, and, probably, the army routed. 

Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover 
our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and general, hearing the roar 
of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general 
commanding, determined to move to its assistance. He advanced, and soon 
encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing that 
at that stage of the conflict the battle was not there. Posting Colonel Dan. C. 
McCook's brigade to take care of any thing in the vicinity and beyond the left 
of our lines, he moved the remainder to the scene of action, reporting to 
General Thomas, who directed him to our suff"ering right. 

Arrived in sight. General Granger discovered at once the peril and point of 
dano'er, the Gap; and quick as thought he directed his advance-brigade upon 
the enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. 
Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A 
thousand of our brave men killed and wounded paid for its possession, but we 
held the Gap. 

Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the position. Determined to 
take it, thej' successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, placed 
in the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a 
few yards of our pieces ; but our grape and canister, and the leaden liail of our 
musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from cartridges taken in 
many instances from their fallen companions, was too much even for Long- 
street's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being 
out of ammunition, rushed on them with the bayonet, and they gave way to 
return no more. 

The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and 
Wood, being less furious towards the left. But a column of the enemy had 
made its way to near our left, and to the right of Colonel McCook's position. 
Apprized of this, General Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from 
its position, and, pointing out the rebels, told him to go in there. 

To save time, the troops of Pieynolds were formed by the rear rank, and, 
moving with the bayonet at a double-quick Avith a shout, walked over the 
rebels, capturing some five hundreil. This closed the battle of the 20th. At 
nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along tlie whole line, and sank into 
quietude without attempting to renew the coiiil)at. 

General Thomas, considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity 
of ammunition, food, and water, and having orders from the general command- 
ino- to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived 
in^good order and took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chatta- 
noo'ga, and offering the enemy battle during all the next day and repulsing his 
reco^noissance. On the night of the 21st, we withdrew from Rossville, took 
firm possession of the objective point of our campaign, — Chattanooga, — and 
prepared to hoM it. 

The operations of the cavalry during the battle of the 19th were very import- 
ant. General Mitchell, with tliree brigades, covered our right flank along the 
line of the Chickamauga above Crawfish Springs, against the combined efl'orts 
of the great body of the rebel cavalry, whose attempts to cross the stream they 
several times repulsed. 



OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 715 

Wilder fought, dismounted, near tlie centre, intervening, two or tliree times, 
with mountain-howitzers and Spencer rifles very opportunely. 

On tlie 20th, Minty covered our left and rear at Mission Mills, and later in 
the day on the Ringgold road. 

General Mitchell with his three brigades covered our extreme right, and 
with Wilder's, after its repulse, extended over Mission Ridge, held the whole 
country to the base of Lookout Mountain, and all our trains, artillery, caissons, 
and spai-e wagons, sent there for greater safety, retiring from the field. Ho 
Avas joined by Post's brigade of Davis's division, which had not closed on the 
army and was not in action. 

<Jn the 21st the cavalry still covered our right as securely as before, fighting 
and holdingnat bay very superior numbers. The number of cavali-y combats 
during the whole campaign have been numerous, the successes as numerous; 
but the army could not have dispensed with those of the 19th, 20th, and 21st. 

Our artillery fired fewer rounds than at Stone River, but with even greater 
effect. I cannot but congratulate the country on the rapid improvement evinced 
in this part of the service. Our loss of pieces is in part attributable to the 
rough wooded ground in which we fought, and to want of experience in posting 
artillery, and partly to the unequal nature of the contest, our infantry being 
heavily outnumbered. 

For the details of these actions, the innumerable instances of distinguished 
bravery, skill, and gallantry' displayed by officers of every rank, and, above 
all, for self-reliant, cool, and steady courage displaj'ed by the soldiers of the 
army of all arms, in many instances even shining above that of their officers, 
1 must refer to the accompanying reports of corps, division, brigade, regi- 
mental, and battery commanders. The reports of the cavalry commands are 
not in, for the best of all reasons, — that they have been out nearly ever since, 
writing with their sabres on the heads and backs of the enemy. 

The Signal Corps has been growing into usefulness and favor daily for the 
last four months, and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the 
statf services. It rendered very important service from the time we reached 
the Valley of the Tennessee. For its operations I refer to the report of Cap- 
tain Jesse Merrill, Chief Signal Officer. 

Our Medical Corps proved very efficient during the whole campaign, and 
especially during and subsequent to the battle. A full share of praise is due 
to Dr. Glover Perin, the Medical Director of the department, ably assisted by 
Drs. Grose, Medical Director 14th, Perkins, 20th, and Phelps, 21st Army Corps. 
A very great meed of praise is due Captain Horace Porter, of the Ordnance 
Department, for the wise system of arming each regiment with arms of the 
same calibre, and having the ammunition wagons properly marked, by which 
most of the difficulties in supplying ammunition, when troops had exhausted it 
in battle, were obviated. From his report it will be seen that we expended 
2,650,000 rounds of musket-cartridges, and 7325 rounds of cannon-ammunition, 
being 12,675 rounds less of artillery, and 650,000 rounds more of musketry, 
than at Stone River. 

We lost 36 pieces of artillery, 20 caissons, 5834 infantry accoutrements, 8450 
stand of small arms. 

From the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles, Provost-Marshal General, it 
will be seen that we took 2003 prisoners. We have missing, of which 

some 600 have escaped and come in, and probably 700 or 800 are among the 
killed and wounded. Of our wounded, some 2500 fell into the hands of the 
enemy, swelling the balance of prisoners against us to about 5500. 

It is proper to observe that the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely neces- 
sary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a 
country covered with woods and undergrowth and wholly unknown to us. Everj* 
division came into action opportunely and fought squarely on the 19th. We 
were largely outnumbered, yet foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, 
and secured our own position on the road to Chattanooga. The battle of the 20th 
was fought with all the troops we had, and, but for the extension and delay in 
closing our right, we should probably have driven the enemy, whom we really 
beat on the field. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours. 



716 THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN. 

It is my duty to notice the services of those faithful officers who have none 
but myself to notice them. 

To Major-Geiieral Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted 
commander, tlie modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and the gratitude 
of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga. 

Major-Geiieral Granger, by his promptitude, arrived and carried his troops 
into action in time to save the day. He deserves the highest praise. 

Major-General McCook, for the care of his command, prompt and willing 
execution of orders, to the best of his ability, deserves this testimonial of my 
approbation. 

1 bear testimony likewise to the high hearted, noble Major-General Crittenden. 
Prompt iu the moving and reporting the position of his troops, al»rays fearless 
on the field of battle, I return my thanks for the promptness and militai-y good' 
sense with which he sent his division towards the noise of battle on the 19th. 

To Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, Chief of Staff, I am especially 
indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of 
action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the general com- 
manding. 

Colonel J. C. McKibben, A.D.C., always efficient, gallant, and untiring, and 
fearless in battle. 

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Ducat, brave, prompt, and energetic in action. 

Major Frank S. Bond, senior A.D.C., Captain J. P. Drouillard, A.D.C., and 
Captain R. S. Thoms, A.D.C., deserve my honorable mention for the faith- 
ful and efficient discharge of their appropriate duties always, and especially 
during the battle. 

Colonel Jas. Barnett, Chief of Artillery ; Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, Chief 
Commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hodges, Chief Quartermaster; Dr. G. 
Perin, Medical Director; Captain Horace Porter, Chief of Ordnance; Captain 
Wm. E. Merrill, Chief Topographical Engineer ; Brigadier-General J. St. Clair 
Morton, were all in the battle, and discharged their duties with ability and to 
my entire satisfaction. 

Colonel Wm. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and his command, have 
rendered very valuable services in keeping open communications and watching 
the movements of the enemy, which deserve my warmest thanks. 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Ward, with the 10th Ohio Provost and Head- 
Quarters Guard, rendered efficient and valuable services, especially on the 20th, 
in covering the movement of retiring trains on the Dry Valley road, and 
stopping the stragglers from the fight. Captain Garner and the escort deserve 
mention for untiring energy in carrying orders. 

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant- 
Colonel AVm. M. Wiles, Provost-Marshal General; Major Wm. McMichael, 
Assistant Adjutant-General ; Surgeon H. H. Seyes, Medical Inspector; Captain 
D. G. Swain, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of the Secret Service; 
Captain William Farrar, Aide-de-Camp ; Captain J. H. Young, General Commis- 
sary of Musters; Captain A. S. Burt, Acting Assistant inspector-General; 
Captain H. Brooke, Acting .Judge- Advocate ; Captain W. C. Morgendant, Acting 
Topographical Engineer : Lieutenant George Burroughs, Topographical En- 
gineer; Lieutenant Wm. Porter, Acting Aide-de-Camp ; Lieutenant James Rey- 
nolds, Acting Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant M. J. Kelly, Chief of Couriers; and 
Assistant Surgeon D. Baclie, were on the field of battle, and there and else- 
where discharged their duties with zeal and ability. 

I must not omit Colonel J. P. Sanderson, of tlic regular infantry, who, having 
lately joined us, on those two days of battle acted as aide-de-camp, and carried 
ord^-rs to the hottest part of the field. 

Of those division and brigade commanders whose gallantry, skill, and ser- 
vices are prominent, individual special mention accompanies this report. A 
list of the names of those, and others, of every grade, whose conduct, accord- 
ing to the reports of their respective commanders, deserves special mention, is 
also herewith sent. 

Major-General W. S. Rosecbans. 



CONTENTS 



"ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.' 



Three Editions Sold in 60 Days. 



Biographical Sketches, with Steel Plates. 



Miijor-Goneral WiUiam S. U(is<'cr;iiis. 

Officers of Staff. 
Major-Gencral George H. Tliomas. 

Officers of Staff. 
Major-General A. McD. McCook. 
Major-General L. H. Rousm'aii. 

Officers of Staff. 
Major-General J. S. NegUy. 

Officers of Staff. 
Major-General John McA. I'aliner 

Officers of Staff. 
Slajor-Gcneral P. II. Slu-ridivn. 

Officers of Staff. 
Brigadier-General K. W. ,I.ilin>on. 
' Officers of Staff. 
Brigadier-General Jeffer.^on C. tkivis 

Officers of Staff. 
Drigadier-General II. P. Van Oleve. 

Officers of Stuff. 



Brigadier-General J. St. Clair Morton (Piiiieor 
Brigade). 
Officers of Staff. 

Colonel 'VVilliani P. Innes (1st Michigan Engi- 
neers ). 
Officers uf Staff. 

Major-General D. S. StJtnley (Chief of Cavalry). 

Colonel U. II. G.Minty. 

Colonyl Eli Long. 

Colonel William B. Stokes. 

Captain Khner Otis. 

Brigadier-General W. B. Hazen. 

Brigadier-Genera AV. P. Carlin. 

C^ilonol H. C. lleg. 

Colonel J. T. Wilder. 

Colonel W. L. StongUton. 

Colonel .1. W. Burke. 

Brigadier-General J. W. Sill (deceased). 

Colonel J. P. Gareschfe (ileceased). 

Colonel G. W. Roberts (deceased). 

Colonel Leiuider Stem (deceased). 



Army Departments. 



General Rosccrans's Head-Quarters. 

Quartermaster's Department. 

dtommissary Department. 

Provost-Marshal General's Department. 

Medical Department. 

Artillery Department. 

Signal Corps and Telegraph l)(4)artmeiit. 



Army Mail. 

Army Directory. 

.\rmy Chaplains. 

Head-Quarters Chaplain. 

United States Sanitary Commission. 

.\rmy Police Department, and its Chief. 



The Expeditions, Battles, and Skirmishes 

Of the Army of the Cumberland, from fiist to last, under General Roeecrans, ending with Chicka- 



Army Police Record 

Of Spies, Smugglers, and RebBl Emissaries: a notable Record of over '200 pages, which is prodncin- 
a sensation throughout the country. 

Miscellaneous. 

Anecdotes, Incidents, Poetry, Ac, ori;;ina1, true, and interesting, filling some 50 pages of fine type 

Appendix. 

Official Report of Gen.-ral.s i:,.s.Mnins and Bragg, of the Battle of Stono River. 



<.•*-■■ 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




013 702 432 9 



' Trutli stranger tlian Fiction 1 1" 



A Cheap and Popular Pamphlet. 



REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENTS 



SPIES AND SMUGGLERS 

IN THE 



TRUE NARRATIVES— EVERY STATEMENT 
SWORN TO, AND CAN BE PROVED! 



ALSO, 



'Army Anecdotes, Incidents, and Poetry, 
of actual occurrence* 



Beautiful Steel Plates of Major-Generals Rosecrans 
and Thomas and the Chief of Police. 



ELEGANT -WOOD-CUT ILLUSTRATIONS. 



Being extracts from the most beautiful and correct war publication 
ever issued. 

Tlie profits from the sale of the Spy Pamphlet, as well as of the 
"Annals," to be expended in the 

ERECTION OF A MONUMENT UPON THE BATTLE- 
FIELDS OF STONE RIVER. 

Let the patriot, the Union man, tlie lover of his country, buy Uils 
work, with a threefold objecfin view:— 

To get an inside glimpse of the R<>bellion in Tennessee. 

To appreciate and compliment the gallant heroes of the Army of 
the Cumberland. 

To aid in building a Monument to the memory of our soldicr-dcad ! 




